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ABSTRACT
A sustainable Evolvable Hardware (EH) system is developed for SRAM-based
reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) using outlier detection and
group testing-based assessment principles. The fault diagnosis methods presented herein
leverage throughput-driven, relative fitness assessment to maintain resource viability
autonomously. Group testing-based techniques are developed for adaptive input-driven
fault isolation in FPGAs, without the need for exhaustive testing or coding-based
evaluation. The techniques maintain the device operational, and when possible generate
validated outputs throughout the repair process.

Adaptive fault isolation methods based on discrepancy-enabled pair-wise comparisons
are developed. By observing the discrepancy characteristics of multiple Concurrent
Error Detection (CED) configurations, a method for robust detection of faults is
developed based on pairwise parallel evaluation using Discrepancy Mirror logic. The
results from the analytical FPGA model are demonstrated via a self-healing, selforganizing evolvable hardware system. Reconfigurability of the SRAM-based FPGA is
leveraged to identify logic resource faults which are successively excluded by group
testing using alternate device configurations. This simplifies the system architect’s role
to definition of functionality using a high-level Hardware Description Language (HDL)
and system-level performance versus availability operating point. System availability,
throughput, and mean time to isolate faults are monitored and maintained using an
Observer-Controller model. Results are demonstrated using a Data Encryption Standard
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(DES) core that occupies approximately 305 FPGA slices on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro
FPGA.

With a single simulated stuck-at-fault, the system identifies a completely

validated replacement configuration within three to five positive tests. The approach
demonstrates a readily-implemented yet robust organic hardware application framework
featuring a high degree of autonomous self-control.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Reliable and efficient detection, isolation, and handling of failures within electronic
circuits are fundamental issues in the design of dependable devices. With production
exceeding 100 million units per year, SRAM-based FPGA devices are frequently used in
a wide range of embedded applications requiring high levels of reliability and
availability.

1.1. Need for Evolvable Hardware Regeneration Methods and Group Testingbased Fault Diagnosis
Reconfigurable devices, such as FPGAs, enable new fault handling techniques based on
evolvable hardware regeneration. Evolvable hardware regeneration techniques use the
principle of biological evolution to handle faults. Using evolutionary techniques such as
genetic algorithms and cellular automata, the existing redundant hardware resources are
reused or rewired to occlude the fault. The repair process can take place online when the
hardware is in active use, or offline when the regeneration occurs as part of a process
outside the normal computation dataflow.

Such techniques are highly relevant to many embedded device applications, including
remote sensing, applications in hazardous environments, and space missions.

For

instance, deep space satellites such as Stardust contain over 100 FPGA devices [1] while
NASA terrestrial applications routinely employ FPGAs extensively for tasks ranging
from launch control to signal processing.
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SRAM-based FPGAs are of significant

importance due to their high density, unlimited reprogrammability, and growing use in
mission-critical/safety-impacting applications.

Depending on the application, these devices encounter harsh environments of
mechanical/acoustical stress, high ionizing radiation, and thermal stress. Simultaneously,
they are required to operate reliably for long durations with limited or absent capabilities
for diagnosis/replacement in the case of remote applications. For example, in Aerospace
Technology, Space Science, and Earth Science enterprises, the impact from increased
safety and autonomy for FPGAs is highly relevant. On-going research at Ames [2] and
JPL [3] has focused specifically on employing the reconfigurability inherent in various
field programmable devices to increase their reliability and autonomy using evolutionary
mechanisms.

Ground-based applications of FPGAs such as data acquisition devices and
instrumentation systems seek to incorporate self-repair capabilities and provide extended
calibration cycles. One such application is Kennedy Space Center's Advanced Data
Acquisition System (ADAS) [4]. ADAS is a signal acquisition and processing system for
launch control measurements typical of real-time NASA applications that heavily utilize
FPGAs and have high reliability, availability, and maintainability requirements. Some
target components that will benefit from evolvable hardware repair include Analog
Signal Modules, Digital Signal/Control Modules, and Power Management Modules.

There is the need to integrate multiple phases of the fault handling process in an
integrated manner. Further, this should ideally be done while maintaining the uptime,
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and availability of the reconfigurable device. Evolutionary mechanisms can actively
restore mission-critical functionality in SRAM-based FPGA devices. They provide an
attractive alternative to device redundancy for resolving permanent degradation due to
radiation-induced stuck-at-faults, thermal fatigue, oxide breakdown, electro-migration,
and other failures. Potential benefits include recovery without the increased weight and
size normally associated with spares. Without regeneration, spare capacity is finite.
Therefore, an evolutionary fault handling strategy that relies upon resource recycling by
means of leveraging the reconfigurability of FPGAs is required. Regeneration also
provides for graceful degradation of performance with time, where resources are
constantly recycled with minimal impact on system availability.

The capability to

recycle resources at a variable rate, as afforded by evolutionary mechanisms provides the
capability to delay refurbishment to maintain required availability and throughput
requirements.

Such a strategy would rely upon fault isolation to accelerate the

evolutionary repair. However, failures need not be precisely diagnosed due to automatic
evaluation of FPGA residual functionality through intrinsic assessment using a specified
fitness function.

Evolutionary mechanisms rely upon efficient fault detection and isolation schemes. Fault
detection triggers the regeneration operation.

Robust fault detection techniques are

required to detect fault and failures with a low latency. Fault location methods provide
inputs to the repair mechanism which accelerate the repair process, and reduce the search
space of candidate solutions to the fault scenario. The fault isolation technique identified
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in this work is one such method for isolating faults with low latency and minimal
overheads.

1.2. Fault Handling in Reconfigurable Devices
An operational failure occurs when the service delivered deviates from its as-built
specification. A resource fault is the cause of such failures. Fault handling refers to the
entire process by which potential or actual failures are dealt with. Ideally, fault handling
maintains failure-free functionality.

The process of improving fault handling typically involves detection, isolation,
diagnosis, and repair. The detection phase consists of identifying the presence of a fault
in the device. A fault is said to be detected when the effects of a corresponding failure is
observed. Depending on whether the inputs applied manifest an observable failure, the
fault is either be perpetually articulated or intermittently articulated. The articulation of
the fault, and hence its potential for detection, relies on the mapping of the functional
design to the physical resources. Once a failure has been detected, it may be possible to
isolate the faulty resources. Fault location or isolation determines the physical location
of the faulty components. The granularity of isolation may vary, depending on the
architecture, the algorithm, and the isolation tools available. Fault diagnosis thus deals
with the determination of the symptoms and the reason behind the observed failure. A
symptom is an observable effect of a fault. Failures are among the most easily observed
symptoms of a fault and are the basis for the isolation methods developed in the proposed
research. The diagnosis phase may involve obtaining the response of the device to an
4

exhaustive set of inputs using a tool designed solely for performing diagnostic tests. The
last phase consist of fault repair, wherein the effects of the fault are ameliorated to reduce
the occurrence or impact of future failures.

The particular fault handling approach can be classified on the basis of when the faults
are accounted for in the development cycle. Design Time approaches place the emphasis
on Fault Avoidance strategies through design strategies that avoid the occurrence of
faults. Execution Time or Run Time approaches tackle the problem by using Fault
Tolerance and Fault Evasion methods. A Fault-Tolerant system is characterized by its
ability to provide uninterrupted service, conforming to the desired levels of reliability
even in the presence of faults. A dependable or reliable system is one which offers a
level of service that is characterized by its availability or readiness for use when desired.

Embedded fault-handling techniques can also be broadly categorized as diagnostic-based
[5], coding-based [6], or redundancy-based [7], depending on the method used to
implement fault-handling.

Diagnostic-based techniques execute a supplemental

procedure that applies a test vector to a subset of the physical resources.

While

diagnostics offer a compact approach, they can suffer from unavailability of throughput
during testing, a large detection latency, and intractability of search as the number of
physical resources and their piecewise interactions grow large [8].

Coding-based

techniques map the input values to an alternate representation to enforce constraints on
the validity of the outputs. Such encodings based on parity, CRC, Berger, and other
codes can be effective for data storage and transmission [9]. However, they preclude the
occurrence of failures that might map one valid codeword onto another, and thus their
5

general applicability for FPGA logic resources is limited. To avoid such limitations,
embedded techniques frequently rely on component or system-level redundancy.

Fault detection methods are central to fault handling strategies. Fault detection can be
carried out by a mechanism outside the domain of the system under observation. In some
cases it is not feasible to have a separate supervisory system in addition to the system
under test. For such a system to be fault tolerant, it is imperative that the fault detection
tool or system used be fault-tolerant as well, since it will be a part of the system under
observation. To maintain acceptable availability levels, reduction of the fault detection
latency is essential. An evolutionary hardware repair strategy can use the information
provided by the fault isolation strategy to speed up the repair process. In CRR, accurate
knowledge of the physical location of the fault can provide useful inputs to the repair
algorithm. The fault detection and isolation strategy used should ideally be capable of
identifying and locating faults without requiring special test inputs, or an interruption in
the normal data throughput. The hardware resources used by the detector should be
minimal, in order to reduce the number of points of failure, and to conserve floor space.
The detector should be fault-secure meaning it does not propagate incorrect outputs in the
presence of a fault. Section 2.2 provides a detailed overview of selected fault detection
strategies.

1.3. Individual and Population-Centric Fault Assessment
Traditional approaches to fault-detection typically rely on coding-based schemes or
redundancy using a single voter, comparator, or error detector. Those fault checkers
6

possess a single point-of-failure exposure involving the detector elements, or must rely
upon special test-vectors or data encodings to isolate them. Detector components in the
reliability path have been referred to as golden elements [10] because the fault-handling
strategy relies on them to be fault-free.

Also, significantly, previous methods test

individual configurations or resource units to evaluate their fitness.

While such

individual-fitness centric methods provide fault coverage on the device level, they do not
lend to an adaptive, evolving system.

In a redundant system, the problem of fault detection can be simplified by the fact that if
there are no faults, then the outputs of the redundant elements should be identical. An
observed deviation from the this property would imply that the disagreement is a result of
a failure in at least one of the redundant components. Natural laws of competition, as
seen in biological evolution can be applied to improve the performance of electronic
circuits. In fault-detection, a deviation from the normal behavior, as determined by
comparison with another individual design, signifies a state of decreased fitness, as a
result of the manifestation of a hardware fault.

The idea of competition can also be extended to the repair problem, using competitive
pairing as a fitness evaluation technique. Traditional GAs use an absolute measure of
fitness for the individuals to search for improved solutions. In this work, the fitness of
an individual design configuration depends on relative measures computed over a period
of time. The proposed fitness assessment process involves accumulation of discrepancies
across multiple random pairings with other individuals from the population. Such a
population-based approach greatly simplifies the process of fault diagnosis, and uses the
7

fact that the circuit under test continues to operate for the duration of its useful lifetime to
accrue information about the performance of competing individuals. By keeping the
method of fault isolation simple, the cost of repair is reduced and amortized over time,
thus providing a fault-secure system without acceptable overhead.

1.4. Group Testing Techniques and Applications to Fault Tolerance
Group testing is a field of mathematics concerned with the development of efficient
algorithms to identify defective members from a large population. The origin of group
testing is attributed to Robert Dorfman who proposed the first application during World
War II. He devised a scheme for testing blood samples from millions of United States
army draftees for cases of syphilis [11]. He proposed that the blood samples be pooled
for testing, in order to reduce the number of tests required and the associated cost and
effort. If a pool of samples tested positive for syphilis, then the samples that contributed
to the pool would be subject to individual testing. Though this idea of testing groups to
identify faulty units was not practically implemented at the time, it gained currency and
has been the subject of intensive research since. The monograph [12] provides a detailed
look into the current state of group testing applications. The fundamental group testing
problem is to identify a subset Q of defective items from a set P, by conducting the
minimum number of tests on v – subsets of P. A test seeks to identify whether a
particular v – subset is defective, as shown by a positive outcome of the test [11]. Group
testing algorithms are classified as shown in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Group Testing Algorithms
Probabilistic group testing theory assumes a known probability p of an item being
defective, and uses it to guide the isolation process. In Combinatorial Group Testing
(CGT), it is often assumed that D is the subset of defective items among S items whereby
p = |D| = |S|. In sequential group testing algorithms, tests are conducted in succession so
that the results of previous tests are known to guide the current test. In a non-adaptive
test, the tests are pre-designed and executed in parallel, without cognition of the result of
other tests. In a multi-stage algorithm, successive stages of tests utilize informative from
previous stages, and tests in a particular stage are executed in parallel.

Testing is

conducted using a checker or a detector which tests subgroups comprising items from S.
A group testing algorithm is reasonable if it contains no test whose outcome can be
predicted from outcomes of other tests conducted either previously or simultaneously.
To minimize the number of tests required to identify the defectives, it is sufficient to
consider only reasonable algorithms as otherwise the algorithm would be sub-optimal
with respect to this criteria. However, it is not necessary to restrict use to only reasonable
algorithms as there many be me practical advantageous to the fault handling process
when more general techniques are used. This is especially the case when FPGAs must be
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supported on long missions without reducing availability due to the need to execute
additional tests.

CGT techniques have been applied to DNA library screening [13] and more recently to
hardware fault detection [14].

Efficient algorithms designed for reconfigurable

architectures that are capable of solving the fault isolation problem are particularly useful
in NASA applications.

1.5. Contributions of this Dissertation
Improving the fault tolerance of reconfigurable devices is a fundamental issue to be
considered while using such devices in failure-prone environments. This dissertation
develops a strategy for the integration of multiple phases of the fault handling process for
reconfigurable devices. While traditional approaches to these problems rely on unique
instances of dedicated hardware elements, this dissertation investigates a new technique
based on iterative pairwise comparison and functional regeneration. Under the proposed
approach, an initial population consisting of a set of functionally identical (same inputoutput behavior), yet physically distinct (alternative design or place-and-route
realizations) FPGA configurations are produced at design time. The performance of
these configurations is evaluated by comparing them in pairs. The result of the pairwise
comparisons are then utilized to realize a fault location strategy. The fault location
information obtained can then be used to guide the hardware regeneration process.
Evolutionary repair techniques inspired by Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are used to realize
the repair. The methods presented here provide, for the first time, a fault isolation
10

strategy that works in conjunction with an evolutionary refurbishment mechanism.
Significantly, the group testing-based isolation strategy presented here does not require
the device to be taken completely offline, or for the resources to be tested exhaustively.
This dissertation provides an example of how fault isolation can be achieved while
maintaining the system’s availability as measured by its goodput.

The competitive evolutionary method presented here leverages information contained in a
population of alternatives to enable the refurbishment of faulty configurations. In the
context that functional elements are groupings of the underlying physical resources, this
research proposes utilization of Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) methods to analyze
the expected performance. A comprehensive toolkit for injecting stuck-at faults in FPGA
logic for the purpose of evaluating group testing algorithms is developed. This is used to
demonstrate the efficiency of CGT techniques in fault isolation. CGT methods are used
to develop algorithms for isolating faults using the minimal number of pairings to
establish optimality bounds. Further, analytical equation which describe the bounds of
the system are derived.

11

CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS WORK

Fault tolerance techniques include both Fault Avoidance and Fault Handling approaches.
Fault Avoidance strives to prevent malfunctions from occurring. This approach increases
the probability that the system is functioning correctly throughout its operational life,
thereby increasing the system’s reliability. Implementing Fault Avoidance tactics such as
increasing radiation shielding can protect a system from Single Event Effects. If those
methods fail, however, Fault Handling methodologies can respond to or recover lost
functionality. Whereas some fault handling schemes maintain system operation, some
fault handling schemes require removing the system offline to recover from a fault,
thereby decreasing the system’s availability.

This limited decrease in availability,

however, can increase overall reliability.

Hardware failures in FPGA occur variously due to device degradation over age, or due to
environmental factors. Ionization, electromigration, hot carrier effects, and other device
degenerative effects may cause device faults in the FPGAs used by such applications. In
all of the above scenarios, these devices are mandated to operate reliably for long mission
durations with limited or absent capabilities for diagnosis/replacement and little onboard
capacity for spares. Specifically, when in a space environment, FPGAs are subject to the
effects of high-energy particles or radiation. Cosmic rays and high-energy protons can
cause malfunctions to occur in systems located on FPGAs. These malfunctions may be a
result of Single-Event Latch-ups (SELs) or Single-Event Upsets (SEUs). SEUs are
transient in nature, inverting bits stored in memory cells or registers, whereas SELs may
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be permanent by inducing high operating current into sensitive devices. While all FPGAs
containing memory cells or registers are vulnerable to SEUs, anti-fuse FPGAs are
particularly resilient since they do not depend upon SRAM cells to store its configuration.
Reconfigurable FPGAs, on the other hand, store its configuration in SRAM cells, which
increases the risk to SEUs. Over the years, designers have developed methods for SRAM
FPGAs to allow reconfigurability in space applications while mitigated the risk of SEUs.

Radiation-hard SRAM FPGAs have fulfilled the rising demand for FPGAs in space
applications. Before their availability, designers of satellites and rovers had no serious
alternative to the one-time programmable anti-fuse FPGA. If the inherent fault handling
capability of anti-fuse FPGAs was not sufficient, designers were restricted to employing
Design-time Redundancy methods. Due to the reconfigurable nature of SRAM FPGAs,
radiation-hard SRAM FPGAs have allowed designers to consider other fault handling
methods- namely Run-time Fault Handling methods.

2.1. Taxonomy and Nomenclature of FPGA Fault Tolerance Techniques
Figure 1.1 primarily divides Fault Handling approaches into two categories based on its
method of implementation [15].

Architecture-based fault recovery techniques [16]

address faults at the level of the device, allowing manufacturers to increase the
production yield of their FPGAs. These techniques typically require modifications to the
current FPGA architectures that end-users cannot perform.

Once the manufacturer

modifies the architecture for the consumer, the device can tolerate faults from the
manufacturing process or faults occurring during the life of the device. Concealing the
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fault through the underlying fabric of the FPGA is advantageous; users need not know of
the occurring hardware faults. Despite making faults transparent to the user, the ability of
these methods to tolerate faults is limited in both type and number.

Figure 2.1: Classification of FPGA Fault Handling Methods
Configuration-based methods, however, depend upon the end-user for implementation.
These higher-level approaches use the configuration bitstream of the FPGA to integrate
redundancy with a user’s application. By viewing the FPGA as an array of abstract
resources, these techniques may select certain resources for implementation, such as
those exhibiting fault-free behavior.

Whereas Architecture-based methods typically

attempt to address all faults, Configuration-based techniques may consider the
functionality of the circuit to discern between dormant faults and those manifested in the
output. This higher-level approach can determine whether Fault Recovery should occur
immediately or at a more convenient time.
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Figure 2.1 further separates Configuration-based Fault Handling methods into two
categories based on whether an FPGA’s configuration will change at run-time. Designtime Redundancy methods embed processes into the user’s application that mask faults
from the system output. These methods are quick to respond and recover from faults due
to the explicit redundancy inherent to the processes. This speed, however, does come at
the cost of increased resource usage and power. Even when a system operates without
any faults, the overhead for redundancy is continuously present.

In addition to this constant overhead, these methods are not able to change the
configuration of the FPGA. A fixed configuration limits the reliability of a system
throughout its operational life. For example, a Design-time redundancy method may
tolerate one fault and not return to its original redundancy index. This reduced reliability
increases the chance of a second fault causing a system malfunction.

FPGA Run-time
Fault Handling

Static Methods

Spare
Configs

Dynamic Methods

Online
Offline
Recovery Recovery

Spare
Resources

Figure 2.2: Overview of Run-time Fault Handling Methods
Run-time Fault Handling methods strive to increase reliability and Sustainability by
modifying the configuration of the FPGA to adapt to faults. This allows a system to
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remove accumulated SEUs and avoid permanently faulty resources to reclaim its lost
functionality.

In addition, Run-time schemes can transform faulty resources into

constructive components by incorporating stuck-at faulty behavior into the circuit’s
functionality. External processors, which cost additional space, typically determine how
to recover from the fault.

These methods also require additional time either to

reconfigure the FPGA or to generate the new configuration.

Within Run-time Fault Handling, Figure 2.2 illustrates two classes: Static and Dynamic
methods. Of these, Dynamic fault handling methods are the primary focus of this work.
Section 2.2 describes and compares the existing Static Run-time techniques and Section
2.3 addresses the Dynamic Run-time approaches in relation to the concepts used in this
work.

2.2. Static Run-time Fault Handling Methods
Static methods may recover from a fault utilizing design-time compiled spare
configurations or re-mapping and rerouting techniques utilizing spare resources. The
resource allocation and/or pre-designed configurations are independent of the location an
nature of faults detected during run-time. These methods take advantage of the regularity
of the FPGA’s architecture to implement redundancy structures or for designing alternate
configurations. Spare configuration methods must provide sufficient configurations and
require storage space overhead for these, whereas spare resource methods must allocate
sufficient resources to facilitate a repair.
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Spare Configuration-based approaches rely on a population of alternate configurations
that each use a different set of logical resources to respond to faults. These can be
created either at design-time, or at runtime, after the fault has occurred.

The pre-

compiled configuration based technique [17] creates alternative configurations at design
time that use different equivalent columns of FPGA resources. In their non-overlapping
scheme, which has the least resource overhead, a total of C(k+m, m) = (k+m)! / (m!k!)
configurations are required to tolerate faults in m columns, where k is the number of
columns in the base configuration. The required design-time effort for this approach is
high, as it requires manual modification of the design to fit into column sets. Also, the
number of horizontal routes available to the designer is reduced by the resources
consumed by the approach.

The fitness-based and population-based evolutionary

hardware approaches for Field Programmable Transistor Arrays (FPTAs) proposed by
Keymeulen et al. [18] creates alternative configurations for anticipated faults and at
runtime for observed faults respectively. This method provides good resource coverage
and passive runtime operation, however system uptime is impacted severely by failure
occurrence. Also, additional external computational capacity is required to implement
the genetic algorithm that creates the population-based solution at runtime.

Spare Resource-based methods such as the one proposed by lach et al [19] rely on the
availability of standby resources of varying granularity to address faults.

Lach’s

deterministic approach provided redundant resources at design time. This approach
segments the FPGA into static tiles at design time with a known functionality, some
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redundant resources, and a pre-designed alternate configuration.

Spare tiles can be

selected when needed, but their functionality is predetermined and thus limited. Dutt et
al[20] provide an incremental re-routing method for increased flexibility to tolerate fault
on-the-fly. In this method, the FPGA is initially routed without any extra interconnects
for reconfiguration. The technique relies on node-covering in which reconfiguration is
achieved by constructing replacement chains of cells from faulty cells to spare or unused
cells. Using a cost-directed depth-first search strategy, they minimize the overheads
involved in rerouting interconnects when responding to faults. Other innovative methods
to tolerate faults using spare resources include Lakamraju and Tessier’s[21] intra-cluster
repair.

The authors approach fault tolerance for cluster-based FPGA which group

multiple LUT/FF pairs together in clusters. Their method that takes advantage of logical
redundancy in such clusters by replacing fault LUT inputs and logic resources unused in
the original design mapping by defining methods for LUT Input Exchange and Basic
Logic Element exchange. All these re-routing strategies that involve spare resources
require the device to be offline, and the support of an external system to complete the rerouting procedure.

2.3. Dynamic Run-time Fault Handling Methods
Dynamic methods aim to allocate spare resources or otherwise modify the configuration
during run-time after detecting the fault. Whereas these approaches offer the flexibility
of adapting to emergent fault scenarios, additional time is necessary to generate
appropriate configurations to repair the specific faults. Offline recovery methods require

18

the FPGA’s removal from operational status to complete the refurbishment. Online
recovery methods endeavor to maintain some degree of data throughput during the fault
recovery operation, increasing the system’s availability.

2.3.1. Offline Recovery Methods

2.3.1.1.

Genetic Algorithm Repair

Genetic Algorithms (GA) are inspired by evolutionary behavior of biological systems to
produce solutions to computational problems [Mitchell 1998]. Suitable for complex
search spaces, GAs have proven valuable in a wide range of multimodal or discontinuous
optimization problems. Previous research has investigated the capability of GAs to
design digital circuits [Miller et al. 1997] and repair them upon a fault [Keymuelen et al.,
2000]. Vigander [2001] proposes the use of GAs to repair faulty FPGA circuits. As a
proof of concept, Vigander implements extrinsic evolution, utilizing a simulated feedforward model of the FPGA device with genetic chromosomes representing logic and
interconnect configurations.

The evolution process begins with initializing a population of candidate solutions. These
initial solutions contain different physical implementations of the same functional circuit.
In the midst of a fault, the performance of each configuration is evaluated, revealing
which configurations are most affected by the fault.

If none of the available

configurations provides the desired functionality, then genetic operators create a new
population of diverse candidate solutions from the previous configurations.
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Those

previous configurations having a higher performance rating are more likely to be selected
and combine with other configurations by the Crossover genetic operator. Additionally,
the Mutation genetic operator injects random variations in the newly created candidate
solutions. Vigander also makes use of a Cell Swap operator that allows the functionality
and connectivity of a faulty cell to swap with a spare cell. The GA evaluates the newly
created solutions and replaces poorer performers in the old population with better
performers in the current population to create a new generation of candidate solutions.
This evolutionary process repeats, stopping when an optimal solution is discovered or
after a specific number of generations.

Garvie et al.’s method [22] tolerates permanent faults using jiggling. Jiggling involves
repairing a faulty configuration by using an evolutionary algorithm that uses the other
two healthy modules and fitness feedback from the TMR voting element. Vigander’s,
Garvie’s and other n-plex spatial voting approaches [23] deliver real-time fault
resolution, but increase power consumption and area requirement n-fold during fault-free
operation. Previously, these evolutionary approaches have only been simulated using
hypothetical device models. They did not attempt application to Commercial Off The
Shelf (COTS) FPGAs and development tools.

2.3.1.2.

Augmented Genetic Algorithm Repair

To decrease the amount of time required to generate a repair, Oreifej et al. [24] augment
Vigander’s Genetic Algorithm fault handling concept with a Combinatorial Group
Testing (CGT) fault isolation technique. Group Testing partitions suspect resources into
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groups and coordinates those groups into a minimal number of tests to isolate the faulty
resource. If a group manifests a fault within one of these tests, then the group is known
to contain the faulty resource and thus the resources within the group are classified as
suspect. In a deterministic manner, the suspect resources are partitioned into iteratively
smaller groups and tested until the faulty resource is isolated.

A population within a GA contains various configurations, each of which categorizes the
FPGA resources into two groups: utilized and unutilized resources. CGT evaluates each
configuration for correct functionality. If a configuration manifests a faulty output, then
the resources used by that configuration are considered suspect.

Since the various

configurations within the population form groups that overlap particular resources, CGT
tests multiple configurations and accumulates the number of times each resource is
considered suspect through a History Matrix. Configurations are rotated through the
FPGA and tested until one element becomes the maximum value within the matrix,
isolating the fault to one resource. The GA, in turn, uses the fault location information to
avoid faulty resources while evolving a repaired configuration.

2.3.1.3.

Incremental Rerouting Algorithms

The Node-Covering method discussed in Section 2.2 avoids a fault by rerouting a circuit
into design-time allocated spares using design-time reserved wire segments. Dutt et al.
[1999] expand this method by dynamically allocating reserved wire segments during run-
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time instead of design-time. Run-time reserved wire segments allow the method to
utilize unused resources in addition to the spares allocated during design-time.

Emmert and Bhatia [25] present a similar Incremental Rerouting approach that does not
require design-time allocated spare resources. The fault recovery method assumes an
FPGA to contain resources not utilized by the application, thus exploiting unused faultfree resources to replace faulty resources. Upon detecting and diagnosing a logic or
interconnection fault by some other detection method, Incremental Rerouting calculates
the new logic netlist to avoid the faulty resource. The method reads the configuration
memory to determine the current netlist and implements the incremental changes through
partial reconfiguration.

Since faulty cells may not be adjacent to a spare resource, a string of cells is created
logically, starting with the faulty cell and ending with the logic cell adjacent to the spare
resource. To avoid the fault, the string of cells shifts away from the faulty resource and
towards the spare resource. In the case of Node-covering, every row has a spare resource
so the string of cells within the row simply shifts to the right, leaving the faulty resource
unused. Since this method does not allocate a spare resource for every row, the string of
cells may extend into multiple rows to reach a spare cell.

Re-placing cells requires the wire segments of the moving logic cells to be rerouted. The
configuration memory of the FPGA is read to determine which nets are affected by the
re-placed logic cells. All faulty nets and those that solely connect the moved logic cells
are ripped-up [25] while those that connect other unmoved logic cells remain unchanged.
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A greedy algorithm then incrementally reroutes each of the dual-terminal nets to
reestablish the application’s original functionality. Initially, the algorithm only uses
spare interconnection resources within the direct routing path, but may expand its scope
to encompass wider routing paths for unroutable nets.

2.3.2. Online Recovery Methods

2.3.2.1.

TMR with Single-Module Repair

Since Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) performs the majority vote of three modules,
the voted output remains correct even if a single module is defective. Exploiting this
concept allows a system to remain online with two viable modules while a defective
module undergoes repair. Methods presented by Ross and Hall [26], Shanthi et al. [27],
and Garvie and Thompson [22] repair the defective module through genetic algorithms.

At design-time, Ross and Hall [26] produce a population of diverse configurations for
implementation. At run-time, three of these configurations are implemented into the
circuit and monitored for discrepancies. Agreeing outputs indicate that the modules are
functioning correctly whereas discrepancies indicate defective resources utilized by one
of the configurations. A mutation genetic operator is applied to defective modules and
the fitness of the new individual is evaluated. The process repeats until the fault is
occluded.
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In addition to the strategy above, Shanthi et al. [27] utilize a deterministic approach in
identifying faulty resources. By monitoring the resources within each configuration,
resources utilized by viable modules gain confidence whereas resources utilized by faulty
modules gain suspicion.

This information allows fault handling by implementing

configurations not using defective resources. Additionally, differing configurations can
be rotated to reveal dormant faults in unused resources.

Instead of selecting from a diverse population, Garvie and Thompson [22] implement
three identical modules.

The commonality between configurations permits a Lazy

Scrubbing technique, which considers the majority vote of the three configurations as the
original configuration when scrubbing a faulty module. Of course, Lazy Scrubbing only
applies when a genetic algorithm has not modified the original configurations to tolerate
a permanent fault.

To address permanent faults, a (1+1) Evolutionary Strategy provides a minimal genetic
algorithm, which produces one genetically modified offspring from one parent and
chooses the most fit between the two. To mitigate the possibility for a misevaluated
offspring replacing a superior parent, a History Window of past mutations is retained to
enable rollback to the superior individual. Normal FPGA operational inputs provide the
test vectors to evaluate the fitness of newly formed individuals. To determine correct
values, an individual’s output is compared to the output of the voter. An individual’s
fitness evaluation is complete when it has received all possible input combinations.
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2.3.2.2.

Online Built-in Self Test

Emmert et al. [28] present an approach that pseudo-exhaustively tests, diagnoses, and
reconfigures resources of the FPGA to restore lost functionality due to permanent faults.
The application logic handles transient faults through a concurrent error-detection
technique and by periodically saving and restoring the system’s state through
checkpointing. As shown in [28], this method partitions the FPGA into an Operational
Area and a Self-Testing ARea (STAR), consisting of a Horizontal STAR and a Vertical
STAR. Such an organization allows normal functionality to occur within the Operational
Area while Built-In Self Tests (BISTs) and fault diagnosis occurs within the STARs.
Whereas other BIST methods may utilize external testing resources assumed fault-free,
the resources-under-test also implement the Test-Pattern Generator (TPG) and the Output
Response Analyzer (ORA).

To provide fault coverage of the entire FPGA, the STARs incrementally rove across the
FPGA, each time exchanging its tested resources for the adjacent, untested resources in
the Operational Area. The H-STAR roves top to bottom then bottom to top while the VSTAR roves left to right then right to left. Whereas one STAR could test and diagnose
programmable logic blocks (PLBs), two STARs are required to test and diagnose
programmable interconnect, the H-STAR for horizontal routing resources and the VSTAR for vertical routing resources.

Where they intersect, the two STARs may

concurrently test both horizontal and vertical routing resources and the connections
between them. Since faults have equal probability to occur within used resources with
unused resources, Roving STARs provides testing for all resources. Uncovering dormant
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faults in unused resources prevents them from being allocated as spares to replace faulty
operational resources.

In addition to facilitating testing, diagnosis, and reconfigurations, a Test and
Reconfiguration Controller (TREC) is responsible for roving the STARs across the
FPGA. The TREC is implemented as an embedded or external microprocessor that
communicates to the FPGA through the Boundary-Scan interface.

All possible

configurations of the STARs are processed during design-time and stored by the TREC
for partial reconfiguration during run-time.

Relocating the STARs through partial

reconfiguration only affects the logic and routing resources within the STAR’s current
and new locations. When a STAR’s next location includes sequential logic, the TREC
pauses the system clock until the logic is completely relocated. In addition to pausing the
system clock, the TREC implements an Adaptable System Clock where the clock speed
is adjusted to account for timing delays arising from new configurations that adapt to
faults.

Roving STARs supports a three-level strategy to handling permanent faults. In the first
level, a STAR detects a fault and remains in the same position to cover the fault. Since a
STAR contains only offline logic and routing resources, testing and diagnosing time is
not at a premium; the application continues to operate normally while the TREC tests and
diagnoses the fault. After diagnosing the fault, the TREC determines if the fault will
affect the functionality that will soon occupy the faulty resources upon moving the
STAR. If the fault will not affect the new configuration’s functionality, such as only
affecting resources that will be unused or spare, then the application’s output will not
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articulate the fault and no action is required.

If the fault will affect the new

configuration’s functionality, then the TREC generates a Fault-Bypassing Roving
Configuration (FABRIC) to reroute incrementally the new configuration so that the fault
will not affect its functionality. Whereas some FABRICs may be compiled during
design-time, most fault scenarios will dictate compiling them online while the STAR
covers the fault. While one STAR covers a fault for testing and diagnosis, the second
STAR, however, may continue roving the FPGA searching for faults in its respective
routing resources and PLBs. The second level strategy then applies the FABRIC that
either was compiled during design-time or was generated during the first-level strategy.
Replacing a faulty resource with a spare one through a FABRIC thus releases the STAR
covering the fault to continue roving the FPGA.

If the fault affects functionality and no spare resources are available to bypass the fault,
then the third strategy is invoked. As a last resort, the TREC has an option to perform
STAR Stealing, which reallocates resources from a STAR to the Operational Area to
bypass the fault. Removing resources from a STAR immobilizes it from roving the
FPGA. Whereas the second STAR can test all PLBs in an FPGA with an immobile
STAR, only half of the routing resources can be tested. In some situations however, a
mobile STAR may intersect and forfeit its resources to an immobile STAR, which
releases the other STAR to rove the FPGA and test the remaining routing resources.

As previously stated, testing and diagnosis occurs within a STAR.

Utilizing the

resources of the STAR through partial reconfiguration, the TREC configures a TPG, an
ORA, and either two Blocks Under Test (BUT) for a PLB test or two Wires Under Test
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(WUT) for an interconnect test. Since no resource may be assumed to be fault-free, the
TPG, BUTs/WUTs, and ORA are rotated through common resources of the STAR. The
TREC maintains the results for all test configurations so that the common faulty
resources can be identified between the two parallel BUTs or WUTs and the rotation of
resources.

2.3.2.3.

Consensus-based Evaluation of Competing Configurations

Whereas previous Online Genetic Algorithm-based methods utilize an N-MR voting
element, the Competitive Runtime Reconfiguration (CRR) approach presented here
handles faults through a pairwise functional output comparison. Similar to previous GA
methods, each of the two individuals is a unique configuration on the target FPGA
exhibiting the desired functionality. CRR divides the FPGA into two mutually exclusive
regions, allocating all Left-Half configurations to one region and Right-Half
configurations to the other region.
population of competing alternatives.

Together, these configurations comprise the
The detection method realizes a traditional

Concurrent Error Detection (CED) arrangement that allocates mutually exclusive
resources for each individual, which detects any single resource fault. The comparison
can result in either a discrepancy or a match between left-half and right-half
configuration outputs, when resource faults are articulated by the configurations that
utilize the faulty resources. Such discrepancies indicate the presence of FPGA resource
faults in either the resources used to constitute the combinational logic module or a
pipeline stage consisting of combinational logic.
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2.4. Fault Detection and Location using Exhaustive Testing Techniques
Several approaches to GA-based fault handling in FPGAs utilize exhaustive testing for
fault isolation and offline regeneration mechanisms. In addition to TMR, Table 2.1 also
lists characteristics of fault-handling schemes that consider reconfigurability.

TMR,

Vigander’s, and other n-plex spatial voting approaches deliver real-time fault resolution,
but increase power consumption n-fold during fault-free operation. STARS [29] is an
example of a resource-oriented diagnostic method that performs Built-in Self-Tests
(BISTs) on sub-sections of the FPGA. STARS extends the concept of using exhaustive
testing by exploiting reconfigurability to occlude faults in the circuits.

Under this

paradigm, the test area roves across all FPGA resources. Portions of the FPGA are
continually taken offline in succession for testing while the functionality is moved to a
new location within the reprogrammable fabric.

The device, however, remains

operational and hence online. One limitation is that detection latency can be large since
tests must sweep through all intervening resources before a fault is detected. Potential
throughput unavailability due to diagnostic reconfigurations when no faults have yet
occurred is also a consideration. However, STARS is a successful example of a method
that uses exhaustive online testing to realize regeneration. Methods proposed by Lohn
[1] and Lach [19] either rely on offline regeneration supported by exhaustive functional
testing, or pre-determined spares defined at design-time.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Related FPGA Fault-Handling Schemes

Fault Detection

Resource Coverage
InterComparator
connect

Fault Isolation

Approach

Fault Handling Method

Latency

Distinguish
Transients

Logic

TMR

Spatial voting

Negligible

No

Yes

Yes

No

Voting element

Vigander [30]

Spatial voting & offline
evolutionary regeneration

Negligible

No

Yes

No

No

Voting element

Lohn et al. [1]

Offline evolutionary
regeneration

Negligible

No

Yes

Yes

No

Unnecessary

Lach et al. [19]

Static-capability tile
reconfiguration

STARs [29]

Online BIST

Up to 8.5M
erroneous outputs

Test pattern
transients

Yes

Yes

No

LUT function

Keymeulen[18]

Population-based fault
insensitive design

Design-time
prevention emphasis

No

Yes

Yes

No

Not addressed
at runtime

CRR

Competitive runtime input
fitness evaluation and
evolutionary regeneration

Negligible

Transients are
attenuated
automatically

Yes

Unnecessary, but
can isolate
functional
components

Granularity

Relies on independent fault detection mechanism

Yes

Yes

Of the methods in Table I, only Keymeulen, Stoica, and Zebulum [18] investigate the
possibility of using a population-based approach to desensitize circuits to faults. They
develop evolutionary techniques so that a circuit is initially designed to remain functional
even in presence of various faults. Their population-based fault tolerant design method
evolves diverse circuits and then selects the most fault-insensitive individual. In this
paper we propose a system that achieves improved fault tolerance by using a runtime
adaptive algorithm that emphasizes the utilization of responses observed during the actual
operation of the device. While their population-based fault tolerance approach provides
passive runtime tolerance, CRR is dynamic and actively improves the fault tolerance of
the system according to environmental demands.
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2.5. Forming a Robust Consensus from Diversity
An evolutionary process that uses absolute fitness measures and exhaustive tests may not
be able to provide adaptive fault tolerance. Layzell and Thompson [31] dealt with these
aspects in terms of Populational Fault Tolerance (PFT) as an inherent quality of
evolvable hardware. Under PFT, the creation of the best-fit individual proceeds by
incrementally incorporating additional elements into partially-correct prototypes to adapt
to faults. They speculate that PFT is less likely to occur for online evolution in dynamic
environments.

Nonetheless, evaluation becomes focused on the precise regions of

relevance within the search space during the execution of online processes. This provides
a powerful motivation to explore CBE.

Yao and Liu [32] emphasize that in evolutionary systems the population contains more
information than any one individual.

They demonstrate the utility of information

contained within the population using case studies from the domains of artificial neural
networks and rule based systems. In both cases, the final collection of individuals
outperforms any single individual. The work in [33] further extends this concept by
presenting four methods for combining the different individuals in the final population to
generate system outputs. They provide similar results for three data sets, namely the
Australian credit card assessment problem, the heart disease problem, and the diabetes
problem. While the authors devise a method to utilize the information contained in the
population to improve the final solution, they fail to use the information in the population
to improve the learning and optimization process itself. The proposed CBE approach
indicates that refurbishment problems can benefit from population information.
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More recently, in [34] the authors describe using fitness sharing and negative correlation
to create a diverse population of solutions. A combined solution is then obtained using a
gating algorithm that ensures the best response to the observed stimuli. In evolvable
hardware, it may not always be possible to combine solutions without additional physical
resources that may also be fault-prone. In our approach, all individuals in the population
are recognized as possible solutions, with the best emerging candidate being selected
based on its runtime performance record. The authors also claim that applying the
described techniques to evolvable hardware applications should be straightforward, but
do not provide examples. They state the absence of an optimal way of predicting the
future performance of evolved circuits in unforeseen environments as an impediment.
Chapter 3 details how an adaptive system can keep track of the relative performances of
individuals and implicitly build a consensus.

2.6. Improving Reliability using Autonomous Group Testing
In state-of-the-art Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs, the device configuration can be modified
without interrupting the normal operation of the device. For space applications, it is
typical to perform such configuration scrubbing periodically to repair any configuration
errors due to Single Event Upsets (SEUs) [35]. The Xilinx TMR tool software [36] can
be used to not only triplicate the user's design, but also insert logic to repair transient user
memory errors and upsets due to SEUs. TMR can be combined with the scrubbing
method to have a reliable system while preventing soft errors. However, configuration
scrubbing only refreshes a single complete configuration and therefore cannot be used to
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address permanent faults [37]. While an n-modular redundancy scheme such as TMR
ensures validated correct output, the proposed AGT-based technique can minimize the
risk of having two faulty modules. The comparators of the Xilinx TMR tools can be used
to detect the discrepancy among the redundant modules. Discrepancies reported by the
comparators can be used to target all resources used by a faulty module. Once the faulty
module is identified, the GT-based algorithm can localize the fault to a logic slice.
Autonomous group testing aims to avoid system failure by providing methods to isolate
permanent faults and maintain a healthy population of configurations for each redundant
module.
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CHAPTER 3: COMPETITIVE RUNTIME RECONFIGURATION
FAULT HANDLING PARADIGM

While the fault repair capability of Evolvable Hardware (EH) approaches have been
previously demonstrated, further improvements to fault handling capability can be
achieved by exploiting population diversity during all phases of the fault handling
process. In existing fault-handling methods for reconfigurable hardware, fault-tolerance
is evolved at design time, or achieved at repair-time using evolution after taking a
detected failed unit offline. In both cases, GAs provided a population-based optimization
algorithm with the objective of producing a single best-fit individual as the final product.
They rely on a pre-determined static fitness function that does not consider an
individual's utility relative to the rest of the population. The evaluation mechanisms used
in previous approaches depend on the application of exhaustive test vectors to determine
the individual with the best response to all possible inputs.

However, given that partially complete repairs are often the best attainable [1], [30], other
individuals may outperform the best-fit individual over the range of inputs of interest. In
particular, there is no guarantee that the individual with the best absolute fitness measure
for an exhaustive set of test inputs will correspond to the individual within the population
that has the best performance among individuals under the subset of inputs actually
applied.

Thus, exhaustive evaluation of regenerated alternatives is computationally

expensive, yet not necessarily indicative of the optimal performing individual among a
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population of partially correct repairs. Hence, two innovations are developed herein for
sustainable EH regeneration:

1. Elimination of additional test vectors, and
2. Temporal Assessment based on aging and outlier identification
In CRR, an initial population of functionally identical (same input-output behavior), yet
physically

distinct

(alternative

design

or

place-and-route

realization)

FPGA

configurations is produced at design time. During runtime, these individuals compete for
selection based on discrepancy favoring fault-free behavior. Discrepant behavior, where
the outputs of two competing individuals do not agree on a bit-by-bit basis, is used as the
basis for the performance evaluation process.

Any operationally visible fault will

decrease the fitness of just those configurations that use it. Over a period of time, as the
result of successive comparisons, a consensus emerges from the population regarding the
relative fitness of all individuals. This allows the classification of configurations into
ranges of relative reliabilities based on their observed performance during online
operation.

3.1. Detecting Faults using a Population of Alternatives
In order to provide fault coverage for the voting element, a distributed discrepancy
detector circuit may be used, as described in Section 4.3.

Each individual in the

population has an instance of one of the two complementary halves of the discrepancy
detector circuit. When two competing L and R half-configurations are loaded on the
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FPGA, the discrepancy detector circuit is completed. The design of the discrepancy
detector accounts for the possibility of error in either, or both of the complementary
halves of the detector. Such an error would reflect on the performance of the halfconfigurations that instantiated the detector hence degrading any preference for selection
of those individuals as described below.

INPUT DATA
CONFIGURATION BIT STREAM

R
Half-Configuration

L
Half-Configuration

Function Logic R

Function Logic L

`
Discrepancy Check L

Discrepancy Check R
DATA OUTPUT

Reconfigurable FPGA Device

Figure 3.1: Physical Arrangement with Two Competing Configurations

3.2. Assessing Individual Fitness and Managing Fitness States
Instead of using an absolute fitness function with exhaustive testing, outlier identification
can be achieved using techniques such as the hat matrix [38], H, where the diagonal
elements Hii are used to identify the threshold to isolate faulty individuals as outliers.
The threshold value is determined by an analysis of the diagonal elements Hii of the hat
matrix generated from population statistics accumulated over an evaluation window. The
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relative reliability of an individual is indicated by its instantaneous fitness state. Through
run-time competition, and the concomitant fitness state assignment, a fault becomes
occluded from the visibility of subsequent FPGA operations.

Health state transitions are managed by the procedural flow for the CRR algorithm as
depicted in Figure 3.2.

After Initialization, the Selection of the L and R half-

configurations occurs. The selected individuals are then loaded onto the FPGA. Next,
the Detection process is conducted when the normal data processing inputs are applied to
the FPGA. The DVs of the competing half-configurations are updated based on whether
or not their outputs are discrepant. The central Primary Loop representing discrepancyfree behavior can repeat without reselection as long as there is no discrepancy. However,
even in the absence of any observed discrepancies, one or more of the competing
individuals may be replaced to hasten regeneration in the presence of Under Repair
individuals. As described later, the Replacement Rate, RX, determines the frequency with
which such discrepancy-free individuals are replaced to allow rotation of other
individuals from the Dormant pool. The system availability can be increased by using a
low value of RX.
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L, R outputs
Adjust Controls
detection mode, overlap interval, ...

Figure 3.2: Procedural Flow in the CRR Technique
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NO

YES
invoke
Genetic Operators
only once
and only on L or R

NO

The Fitness State Adjustment process will be used to validate and update the state of the
individual after E evaluations. Otherwise reselection will occur, without updating the
fitness state of the individual being replaced. For Under Repair individuals, if the value
of the corresponding Hii element is greater than the threshold value then Genetic
Operators are invoked only once without attempting to achieve complete refurbishment.
The modified configuration is then immediately returned to the pool of competing
configurations and the process resumes starting with the Selection phase.

3.3. Strategic Prioritization of Individuals for Assessment and Refurbishment
The Selection and Detection processes are shown in Figure 3.3. During the selection
process, Pristine, Suspect, and then Refurbished individuals are preferred in that order for
one half-configuration. The selection of individuals based on the relative fitness ensures
the lowest possible probability of two half-configurations agreeing by producing the
same incorrect outputs. The other half-configuration is selected based on a stochastic
process determined by the Re-introduction Rate (λR).

In particular, Under Repair

individuals are selected as one of the competing half-configurations on average at a rate
equal to λR. Thus, a genetically-modified Under Repair configuration is re-introduced at
a controlled rate into the operational throughput flow. They act as a new competitor to
potentially exhibit fault-free behavior against the larger pool of configurations. An
additional innovation is that λR can also be adapted to encourage Mean-Time-To-Repair
(MTTR) << Mean-Time-Between-Failures (MTBF) to refurbish the population at a rate
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not less than new failures are occurring. Maintaining this inequality realizes sustainable
fault-handling under fully autonomous operation.

The Detection process is presented in the lower right corner of Figure 3.3.

If a

discrepancy is observed as a result of output comparison, the FPGA is reconfigured with
a different pair of competing configurations and the output of the device need not be
propagated to allow recalculation.

The evaluation mechanisms used in previous

approaches depend on exhaustive test vectors. They also utilize a pre-determined fitness
evaluation scheme to determine the individual with the best response to all possible
inputs. Other partially repaired individuals may outperform the best-fit individual for the
runtime input vectors. CRR overcomes these issues by using the runtime inputs as the
test vector, and the output of the discrepancy detector to detect faults and provide
information for the subsequent isolation of outliers as described in Section 4.2. Also, the
partially correct outputs generated by competing fault-affected individuals can improve
availability as opposed to keeping a device completely offline while a perfect solution is
being obtained.

In order to isolate and detect faulty individuals in a timely manner, all the individuals in
the population should have an equally likely probability of being selected as the Active
individuals with a suitable interval between successive selections. The Replacement
Rate, RX, is used to monitor this rotation of individuals onboard the FPGA device,
including the individuals not Under Repair.
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Figure 3.3: Selection and Detection in the CRR Paradigm
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3.4. Determination of Evaluation Window
CRR uses runtime-inputs for individual performance evaluation rather than exhaustive
testing with a predefined set of test vectors. Nonetheless, pseudo-exhaustive testing on
an individual basis provides adequate test coverage. While the range and sequence of the
online inputs may not be known at design-time, a probabilistic model is useful to estimate
the expected number of evaluations required to encounter a sufficient range of values
with high probability. The Evaluation Window, E, is selected accordingly. It regulates
the update frequency of each individual’s relative fitness based on DVi values during the
interval.

The characteristics of the circuit under repair influence the determination of E as
illustrated for an unsigned integer multiplier. Let the circuit input width, W, denote the
total number of operand bits to the multiplier. In the case of a 3-bit×3-bit multiplier, W =
6 and the total number of distinct input combinations is 2W = 64. Thus in the case of the
3-bit×3-bit multiplier, an exhaustive set of inputs would consist of all 64 possible
combinations. The problem of determining the number of random inputs needed to
facilitate all possible inputs appearing at least once is similar to the coupon collector
problem [39]. In the coupon collector problem, the expected number of coupons to be
collected before at least one each of D total coupons are collected is given by the
simplified expression, D × HD, where HD is the Dth harmonic sum. However, for the
exhaustive test modeling problem at hand, the number of random inputs required to
facilitate the appearance of all possible inputs with varying confidence factors needs to be
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derived. This problem can be modeled as a game involving selection of balls from a set
of 64 differently colored balls.

A single ball is selected in each drawing, with

replacement. In other words, what is the probability that, after D drawings, at least one
ball of each of the 64 colors appeared at least once? Clearly, for D < 64, the probability
is zero, and for D = 64 is 2.54×10-116 which is highly improbable.

To solve this problem, consider the case where all balls are of one color. After D
⎛1⎞
drawings, we have ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ x1 = 1D where x1 is the number of feasible sample events,
⎝ 1⎠
so x1 = 1D . Now, consider the case when D≥64. In general, a K-color experiment can be
described as a sum of experiments involving smaller numbers of colors for any constant
value of D:

⎛K ⎞
⎛ K ⎞
⎛K⎞
⎛K⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ x K + ⎜⎜
⎟⎟ xK −1 + ......... + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ x2 + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ x1 = K D
⎝K ⎠
⎝ k − 1⎠
⎝2⎠
⎝1⎠

K

or,

⎛K ⎞

∑ ⎜⎜ m ⎟⎟x
m=1

⎝ ⎠

m

= KD

(4.1)

(4.2)

Since the numerical value of K D in Equation (4.2) can be excessively large, it may not
be possible to represent it using an unsigned long variable, the widest variable in a 32-bit
system, since for example 6464 > 232 − 1 .

Therefore, an alternate representation can

consider x K as a sample event in which all K colored balls appear at least once with a
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probability PK . D is the number of drawings, and K D is the total number of possible
permutations, yielding:

PK = xK / K D

(4.3)

Now, by dividing Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) by KD, we obtain respectively,

⎛K ⎞
⎛ K ⎞
⎛K⎞
⎛K ⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ PK + ⎜⎜
⎟⎟ PK −1 + ......... + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P2 + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P1 = 1
⎝K ⎠
⎝ k − 1⎠
⎝2⎠
⎝1⎠

k

⎛k⎞

m =1

⎝ ⎠

∑ ⎜⎜ m ⎟⎟P

and,

m

=1

⎛1⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P1 = x1 / 1D = 1 ⇒ P1 = 1；x1 = 1D
⎝1⎠

So when K=1,

⎛ 2⎞
⎛ 2⎞
⎛ 2⎞
⎛ 2⎞
D
When K=2, ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P2 + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P1 = P2 + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P1 (1D / 2 D ) = 1 ⇒ P2 = 1 − ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P1 (1 / 2)
⎝ 2⎠
⎝1⎠
⎝1⎠
⎝1⎠

(4.4)

(4.5)

(4.6)

(4.7)

Therefore, in general:

⎛ K ⎞ ⎛ (K −1)D ⎞
⎛ K ⎞ ⎛ (K −1)D ⎞
⎟
⎟⎟ = 1
⎟⎟PK−1⎜⎜
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟P1⎜⎜
+
+
.....
PK + ⎜⎜
D
D
⎟
⎝ K −1⎠ ⎝ K ⎠
⎝1⎠ ⎝ K ⎠

(4.8)

⎛ K ⎞
⎛K⎞
⎟⎟ PK −1 (( K − 1) / K ) D − ...... − ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ P1 (( K − 1) / K )D
⇒ PK = 1 − ⎜⎜
⎝ K − 1⎠
⎝1⎠

(4.9)
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Equation (4.9) yields PK recursively without the computational burden of calculating

Probability of K items Appearing At Least Once

K D as (( K − 1) / K ) < 1 for all K.

1.2
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0.0
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Figure 3.4: Effect of Sample Size on Test Coverage
As shown in Figure 3.4, when K=16 colors and D=100 drawings, the probability P16 of all
16 colors appearing is ≈ 100%. Similarly, 250 trials for 32 colors are sufficient given
equi-probable inputs. Table 3.1 shows the result for the case when K=64, which applies
to the 3-bit×3-bit multiplier. In order to achieve comprehensive coverage with a certainty
of 97.59%, approximately 500 evaluations are sufficient. A certainty of 99.50% implies
an evaluation window of width E=600 which was adopted for the fault isolation
experiments in Section 3.6. Thus, in the case of a 3-bit×3-bit multiplier design, if 1-outof-64 inputs articulate a fault in a single individual Ci, and all the input combinations are
equally likely to appear, then the expected discrepancy value after E = 600 evaluations is:

⎛ 1 ⎞
DVi = ⎜ ⎟ × E = 9.375
⎝ 64 ⎠
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(4.10)

Table 3.1: Probability of all 64 Inputs Appearing At Least Once given D Evaluations

D=350
P64

D=400

D=450

D=500

D=550

D=600

D=650

76.96% 88.84% 94.77% 97.59% 99.00% 99.50% 99.77%

3.5. Identifying Outliers using the Sliding Window Technique
From a statistical perspective, the residuals, expressed as the difference between the
expected fault-free behavior and the observed circuit response, of the faulty individuals
are significantly larger than the fault-free individuals when using the Least Squares (LS)
method [38]. However, the LS method is most effective when exactly one outlying
element is expected. In the case of multiple outliers being detected in one Sliding
Window, the mean and the standard deviation alone may not aid in detecting the multiple
outliers leading to a loss in isolation capacity. Also, to increase the confidence with
which outliers are isolated, we increase threshold from one standard deviation from the
mean to a value of 2.5σ. Under these circumstances, a simple method such as the LS
method is not directly applicable.

Another class of outlier diagnostics is based on the principle of detecting the outlier by
the LS projection matrix H. This matrix is well known under the name hat matrix,
because it is denoted by a hat on the column vector y = (y1,…, yn)t such that ŷ=H*y and ŷ
is the LS prediction for y. The hat matrix H is defined as follows: consider there are p
explanatory variables and one response variable which will have n observations. The nby-1 vector of responses is denoted by y=(y1,…, yn)t. The linear model states that
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y=X×θ+e, where θ is the vector of unknown parameters, e is the error vector and X is the
n-by-p matrix:

⎡ x11
⎢x
⎢ 21
X=⎢ M
⎢
⎢ M
⎢ x n1
⎣

x12
x 22
M
M
xn2

.... x1p ⎤
.... x 2p ⎥⎥
M ⎥
⎥
M ⎥
.... x np ⎥⎦

(4.11)

Then, the H matrix is composed from X as follows:

H = X( X t X) −1 X t

(4.12)

The diagonal elements of H have a direct interpretation as the effect exerted by the ith
∧

observation on the expectation of response variable because they equal ∂ y i / ∂y i . The
average value of the diagonal element Hii is p/n and it follows that 0 ≤ H ii ≤ 1 for all i.

In the CRR approach, the DV of each individual can be viewed as one observation or one
explanatory variable, and the Observation Interval can be set as the size of the entire
population.

Fortunately, since the X matrix consists of only one column in our

application, the result of the XtX product is a single-element vector matrix, and its inverse
can be computed using a straightforward one-step computation.
computation complexity of the H matrix approach is 2n2+1.

47

In general, the

The recommended threshold for the identification of outliers is Hii > 2p/n and a stricter
cut-off value 3p/n has been used in previous works [40] [41]. For an analysis of the CRR
problem for fault isolation, setting p = 1 and n = 20 corresponds to one faulty individual
among a population of 20. For example, a cut-off value of 10×

p
10
=
= 0.5 can be
n
20

used in conjunction with a larger Sliding window width of 15 to ensure consistent outlier
identification with 100% certainty.

3.6. Outlier Detection and Fault Isolation Performance with Runtime Inputs
Experimental results regarding the effect of the outlier detection parameters are
illustrated in Figure 3.5 through Figure 13. Each has been generated using a simulator
written in the C++ programming language which utilizes an equi-probable selection of
individuals. In the data reported for experiments, the inputs causing the first discrepancy
are applied once after each pair of faulty configurations is replaced to assess damage
definitively under the single-fault model.

To further illustrate how the DVs are mapped to the Hii values, Figure 3.5 through Figure
13 are presented in pairs that show results from the same experiment. The first Figure in
each pair shows the observed DVs and the subsequent Figure shows the Hii values
calculated using this data. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 depict the identification of outlying
individuals in the population that has a 10-out-of-64 fault impact caused by a single fault.
For example, Figure 3.5 shows the DVs observed over 50 individual evaluations, where
each evaluation occurs after the particular individual has completed E=600 computations
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as an Active configuration on the simulated FPGA. This corresponds to one individual
completing a number of computations equal to E.

From Figure 3.5, an outlier is

identified when ten individuals have completed E iterations.

A sliding window width of 15 was used in this experiment. Based on analysis of the Hii
values, and an outlier cut-off value of 0.5, the outlying individual is identified without
statistically significant error. As shown in Figure 3.5, outliers can be identified with a
regular periodicity. Figure 3.6 shows the plot of Hii values for a subset of evaluations
corresponding to the identification of the first outlier in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.6 also shows
that the outlier in the population exhibits Hii ≈ 0.94 which is over an order of magnitude
larger than Hii ≈ 0.02 of the other competitors. Also, the Hii values of the non-outlying
elements conform to a very narrow window of values, clearly demonstrating that the
penalty for discrepant observations are amortized among the non-defective members of
the population. In Figure 3.5, it can be clearly seen that the first outlier is identified after
11×E = 6600 computations. This period, after which the outlier is detected can be
lowered by reducing the sliding window. By choosing a lower value for the sliding
window, outlier identification will take place at an increased frequency as shown in
subsequent experiments.

In Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, individual performance was measured using a simple
Winner-Takes-All scheme, where the only information available from the discrepancy
detection is bit-wise output equality. A different discrepancy detection mechanism could
provide information such as the Hamming distance of the observed output of an
individual from the desired output.
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Figure 3.5: Discrepancy Values Observed
when One Individual has a 10-out-of-64 Fault Impact

Figure 3.6: Plot of Hii Showing Outlier Identification
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The use of Hamming distance information leads to outliers having a higher discrepancy
value, as shown in Figure 3.7, when compared to Figure 3.5.

As in the previous

experiment, a 10-out-of-64 fault impact is considered, with a sliding window width of 15.
The higher DV of approximately 140 can be accounted for by the fact that the observed
Hamming distance between the observed discrepant output and the desired ideal can be
greater than 1. This is opposed to the previous case, where the presence of a discrepancy
increases the DV of the corresponding individuals by one yielding DV≈70. The outlier
threshold remains the same, nonetheless, since the hat matrix operates on normalized
information. Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show plots of the Discrepancy Value and the H
values when the Hamming distance is used to quantify divergence.
160
140

Discrepancy Value

120

Sliding Window=15
Fault Impact =10/64

100
80

Non-Outlier
Outlier

60
40
20
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

Number of individual evaluations

Figure 3.7: Discrepancy Values Observed When Hamming Distance is Used
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Figure 3.8: Plot of Hii Showing Outlier
Identification When Hamming Distance is Used
In the case when a single faulty L individual with a less catastrophic 1-out-of-64 fault
impact is analyzed, two outlier points are successfully isolated as shown in the Figure
3.9. Figure 3.10 shows the corresponding plot of the Hii for the same experiment. The
detection rate is 100% for this scenario. When compared to the results in Figure 3.5 and
Figure 3.6, it can be seen that the identification takes place more frequently with a
periodicity of approximately 5×E. This corresponds to the use of a narrower sliding
window width as opposed to the 15×E used in the earlier experiment. In Figure 3.9, the
outlier cut-off value is 0.3 as compared to 0.5 in Figure 3.6. Also, the first outlier in
Figure 3.10 is closer to the cut-off value which can be expected with a narrow sliding
window. A wider sliding window width helps reinforce identification, yet too large a
value can delay identification without improving the discrimination among faulty and
viable competitors.
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Figure 3.9: DV of a Single Faulty L Individual With a 1-out-of-64 Fault Impact
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Figure 3.10: Isolation of a Single Faulty L Individual With a 1-out-of-64 Fault Impact
For a greater fault impact, the isolation will be more challenging and time-consuming as
shown in Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12. Both Figures depict the isolation characteristics
for a single faulty L individual with a 32-out-of-64 fault impact. A greater number of
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observations are required than the 1-out-of-64 scenario and the divergence of the outlier
is also greater. Individuals that are eventually identified as outliers are replaced more
often, since the computations involving these individuals produce discrepant outputs.
Under the default replacement strategy for discrepancy-free behavior depicted in Figure
3.3, fault-free individuals reside on the FPGA indefinitely. However, in this experiment,
they are replaced in accordance with the Replacement Rate RX=0.16, which corresponds
to a guaranteed evaluation period of 100 contiguous iterations out of the E=600 window.
Individuals that do not produce discrepant outputs are replaced with other individuals less
frequently than ones that do. Thus, individuals that are not fault-affected complete the
required E number of iterations to complete evaluation much sooner than the faultaffected individuals. This is because discrepancies trigger immediate reconfiguration as a
means of maintaining throughput and improving system availability.

Figure 3.11: DVs Observed When a Single
Faulty Individual has a 32-out-of-64 Fault Impact
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Figure 3.12: Isolation of a Single Faulty L Individual with a 32-out-of-64 fault Impact

3.7. Feed-Forward FPGA Circuit Representation Model
The FPGA structure used in the following experiments is similar to that used by Miller
and Thompson for GA-based arithmetic circuit design [42].

The feed-forward

combinational logic circuit uses a rectangular array of nodes with two inputs and one
output.

Each node represents a Look-up Table (LUT) in the FPGA device, and a

Configurable Logic Block (CLB) is composed of four LUTs. In the array, each CLB will
be a row of the array and two LUTs are represented as four columns of the array. There
are five dyadic functions – OR, AND, XOR, NOR, NAND – and one unary-function
NOT, each of which can be assigned to an LUT. The LUTs in the CLB array are indexed
linearly from 1 to n. Array routing is defined by the internal connectivity and the
inputs/outputs of the array. Internal connectivity is specified by the connections between
the array cells. The inputs of the cells can only be the outputs of cells with lower row
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numbers. Thus, the linear labeling and connection restrictions impose a feed-forward
structure on the combinational circuit.

As an example of the circuit representation, the 3-bit×3-bit multiplier can be
implemented using the above FPGA structure, as shown in Figure 3.13. The entire
configuration utilizes 21 CLBs. XOR gates are excluded from the initial designs to force
usage of a higher number of the gates than conventional multiplier designs to increase the
design space. XOR gates simplify the process of calculating partial binary sums, and
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Figure 3.13: Example of a 3-bit×3-bit Multiplier Design
A library of user-defined modules can be defined to instantiate a population of diverse yet
functionally-equivalent circuits. In this case study, 20 distinct individuals are created at
design-time using a set of 10 or more variations of three fundamental sub-circuits. These
consist of parallel-AND, half-adder, and full-adder primitives. For example, 24 different
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full-adder designs and 18 different half-adder designs were created for use in building the
individual 3-bit×3-bit multiplier designs. Thus, each multiplier is a distinct combination
of building blocks, where each building block itself is chosen from among alternate
designs in the library. Figure 3.13 illustrates an individual with 3 parallel-AND, 3 fulladder, and 6 half-adder modules.

The population of competing alternatives is then divided into two groups, L and R, where
each group uses an exclusive set of physical resources. For crossover to occur such that
offspring are guaranteed to utilize only mutually-exclusive physical resources with other
resident half-configurations, a two-point crossover operation is carried out with another
randomly selected Pristine, Suspect or Refurbished individual belonging to the same
group. By enforcing speciation, breeding occurs exclusively within L or R, and noninterfering resource use is maintained.

The crossover points are chosen along the

boundary of CLBs so that intra-CLB crossover is precluded. The mutation operator
randomly changes the LUT’s functionality or reconnects one input of the LUT to a new,
randomly selected output inside the CLB.

3.8. Refurbishment of a Unique Failed Configuration – 3-bit×3-bit Multiplier
Case Study
In this experiment, GA-based recovery operators are applied to regenerate the
functionality in the affected individuals. In order to simulate a hardware fault in the
FPGA, a single stuck-at fault is inserted at a randomly-chosen LUT input pin. This fault
will affect the L individuals in the population. Similar faults are later introduced into the
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R individuals. Upon observing the first discrepancy, the same inputs are applied once to
the reloaded configurations as a definitive means of damage assessment under a singlefault model. Over 25 experimental runs, an average of 2,171 iterations were required to
dependably demote the fitness state of the affected individual from Pristine to Under
Repair. During regeneration, the genetic algorithm performs inter-module crossover and
intra-module mutation operator called the input permutation operator. Unlike traditional
mutation, the input permutation operator alters a specific LUT’s functionality, choosing
from among AND, OR, XOR, NOR and NAND gates, as also changing the connections
to the input pins. Such mutation in conjunction with the crossover operator enables full
exploration of a wide range of designs.

Table 3.2 lists the evolutionary regeneration characteristics of CRR for stuck-at-0 and
stuck-at-1 faults. The faults were injected at randomly chosen locations in the designs.
For the experiment, DVR DVO, the repair and operational thresholds, were 2.5σ and 1σ
respectively. The use of multiples of standard deviation as the threshold ensures that the
system adapts in the case of catastrophic fault conditions, as well as the condition where
very few discrepancies are observed. The parameters which control the rate at which
individuals are rotated on the FPGA, λR and RX were set at 0.2 and 0.16, respectively.
The reintroduction rate of 0.2 implies that 20% of the computations were carried out
using a pair of individuals, one of which was Under Repair. In spite of this, the effective
throughput remains high and above 97.5% on an average. This shows that individuals
undergoing repair produce useful output approximately 0.975-(1-λR)/λR×100%=87.5% of
the time.
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Table 3.2: Regeneration Characteristics for a Single Fault under CBE

Exp.
Number

Fault Location

Failure
Type

Correctness
Total
Discrepant
after
Iterations
Iterations
Fault

Repair
Final
Iterations Correctness

Throughput
(%)

4.2 × 10

5

1194

64 / 64

97.7

8.0 × 10

5

1.7 × 10

4

47

64 / 64

97.9

22 / 64

3.1 × 10

6

6.8 × 10

4

193

64 / 64

97.8

CLB7,LUT2,Input0 Stuck-at-0

38 / 64

8.1 × 10

6

1.8 × 10

5

513

64 / 64

97.7

CLB9,LUT0,Input1 Stuck-at-0

40 / 64

2.3 × 10

6

7.1 × 10

4

219

64 / 64

96.9

32.6 / 64

6.4 × 10

1.5 × 10

5

433

64 / 64

97.6

1

CLB3,LUT0,Input1 Stuck-at-1

52 / 64

1.7 × 10

2

CLB6,LUT0,Input1 Stuck-at-0

33 / 64

3

CLB5,LUT2,Input0 Stuck-at-1

4
5

Average

7

6

Using a higher value for λR will lead to faster regeneration at an incremental cost to repair
throughput. This provides a great deal of adaptability and fine-grained control over
system performance measured in terms of availability and regeneration latency. Unlike
other circuit design and regeneration approaches, CRR can be optimized to reduce
downtime, increase availability, or to speed up the fault identification and regeneration
process. The results listed in Table 3.2 indicate that the evolutionary algorithm is capable
of regeneration for the tested fault locations.

The correctness of the affected

configurations is raised from as low as 22-out-of-64 correctness to complete operational
suitability. The effective throughput is maintained throughout at above 97.6%. It can
also be seen that CRR-based regeneration can be more computational tractable without
exhaustive evaluation, as is listed in the Repair Iterations column.

In Vigander’s experiment with using a voting system in conjunction with TMR [30], the
target circuit is a 4-bit×4-bit multiplier. With a population size of 50, and a crossover
rate of 70%, most of the 44 runs developed a set of three modules which vote to provide
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fully-fit output for the exhaustive set of 256 unique input combinations. However, it is
not always able to identify a single fully repaired individual. Vigander’s experiment has
a population size of 50, which is 500% greater than the population in the repair
experiments attempted herein. Most significantly, it relies on exhaustive serial testing
against the set of all possible inputs.

CRR, however, achieves refurbishment with

runtime inputs, continually providing some validated outputs that maintains useful
throughput above 85%. Compared to Jiggling [22], which is a similar evolutionaryalgorithm based approach to repairing permanent faults, CRR has lower latency by virtue
of not relying on exhaustive tracking of the repair candidates. Additionally, the (1+1)
Evolutionary System described therein relies on rollbacks to preserve best-fit mutants.
CRR, by virtue of depending on a population of higher-fit alternatives that are evaluated
temporally over many iterations, precludes the need for rollback of configurations and
ensures higher populational fault tolerance capability. Significantly, as opposed to the
work of Keymeulen in populational fault tolerance [18], CRR achieves device
refurbishment at runtime, while ensuring sustainable levels of throughput with graceful
degradation.

As compared to the Roving STARs approach [29], CRR minimizes

detection latency, as faults are evident immediately upon a discrepancy at the outputs.
Also, unlike STARs, by virtue of the runtime-input based performance evaluation, CRR
leverages partially-fit configurations to provide some functional throughput.

This

effectively improves the granularity of spare usage to include those affected by stuck-at
faults, as the GA may evolve solutions that use fault-affected resources in generating
repair configurations.
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In Summary of the Repair experiments, evolutionary regeneration addresses a problem
domain that is distinct from evolutionary design. Namely, regeneration can benefit from
a population of partially working designs which provide diverse, relevant alternates. This
also allows departure from conventional fitness evaluation with a rigid individual-centric
fitness measure defined at design-time. CRR uses instead, a self-adapting, populationcentric assessment method at runtime. CRR relies on the consensus observed among a
group of individuals to evolve and adapt fitness criteria for individual members, thus
providing graceful degradation.

By utilizing outlier detection techniques that work

temporally without the need for exhaustive testing, CRR provides a fault tolerance
technique that maximizes device throughput during the fault detection process.

While the pre-existing methods focus on creating a single fully-fit configuration, CRR
extends this to maintain a population of solutions that have a higher average fitness. This
ensures the adaptability of the population of viable alternatives to a variety of
unanticipated faults.

An additional benefit of maintaining a population of diverse

partially-fit individuals is that when the inputs to the system are localized to a subset of
the set of all possible inputs, even partially-fit individuals can assist in generating
expected outputs, thereby improving the rate of viable throughput during recovery.

Population-centric assessment methods such as CRR can provide an additional degree of
adaptability and autonomy to fault-handling in reconfigurable devices. The demonstrated
potential of such population-centric methods can be further enhanced as follows, and as
further explored in the subsequent chapters. After discrepancy detection, a CGT method
which tracks utilization of resource sets among individuals in the population, is used to
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identify the stage containing the faulty resource. This is readily incorporated within the
configuration selection step of CRR. The genetic operators are then applied only to that
isolated stage to attempt recovery, thus providing an approach to extend the CRR method
to larger circuits while remaining computationally tractable.

In order to accelerate the fault recovery process, a fault detection and isolation method
that functions on the run-time inputs is required. Further, the method has to operate on
the basis of comparisons between two functional configurations’ performance. In the
next chapter, a discrepancy-enabled dueling scheme is presented that enable fast fault
detection.
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CHAPTER 4: FAULT ISOLATION USING GROUP TESTING

A fault detection and isolation method for stuck-at logic faults in FPGAs is developed
starting from a simple reconfigurable device model. A discrepancy detector is realized
and implemented in CMOS to demonstrate the viability of the approach. Starting from a
fully-articulating fault model, a general outline for discrepancy-enabled group testing is
generated and expanded to the a partially-articulating fault model. Finally, examples of
adapting group testing techniques to improve the performance of GAs and also for
exhaustive BIST-based techniques are presented.

4.1. Motivating Example and Problem Definition
In order to better understand the group testing problem at hand, consider an analogy
termed the Treasurer's Problem which is related to the Counterfeit Coin Problem [43].
The Counterfeit Coin Problem is extended here by analogy to support arbitrary groupings
of logic cells within FPGAs. In this Treasurer’s Problem, legitimate coins are made of
gold, with the face value of the coins being proportional to their weight. However, some
counterfeit coins have other metals mixed in with the gold, and these counterfeit coins are
to be identified and removed. The weight of an impure coin is different from the weight
of pure coins of the same denomination. The treasurer must inspect large quantities of
coins for authenticity. Most significantly, since the number of counterfeit instances is
small relative to the total number of coins present, the treasurer does not weigh the coins
individually. Instead the coins are in a vat, and the treasurer retreives coins from the vat
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to fill bags containing exactly 100 monetary units worth of coins. The number of coins in
each bag may vary because of their multiple denominations, yet due to the property that
their mass is proportional to their denomination then only two equally-valued legitimate
bags will display equal weight.

Using a pan balance, the treasurer compares the weight of two bags at a time to determine
whether they are equal weight or not. The coins from the bags may be returned to the vat
after weighing, so that they can be filled in other bags later after shuffling. Given these
pre-conditions, a number of questions arise about how the treasurer will identify any
faulty coinage such as: How many weighings will the treasurer need to identify bags
containing the impure coins? Can the impure coin be identified, if there was only one?

These questions are analagous to the problems addressed in this paper for identification
of a faulty physical resource used by a functional arrangement of FPGA configurations.
FPGA devices are composed of an array of logic resources such as LUTs that are utilized
by functional configurations just as the coins are grouped into a bag for weighing. A
digital design can be mapped onto the resources on an FPGA in several ways, just like a
bag worth 100 monetary units can be filled with coins of different denominations in
several different ways. When one of the resources used by a configuration is faulty, the
output of the configuration in response to an input may be faulty. Identifying the faulty
resource from among many fault free resources, without testing the resources individually
is a challenging task. Exhaustive testing of the individual resources is time consuming
which takes the device offline and reduces its availability. By analogy, if the coins were
weighed and checked individually, the time required would be phenomenal to locate a
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single faulty coin out of thousands of coins.

Instead, we re-cast the problem of

identifying the faulty resource into one of making choices for group comparison from
among the given FPGA configurations.

4.2. Fault Isolation by Discrepancy-Enabled Repetitive pairing
Robust fault detection is central to the problem of enhancing the fault-handling
capabilities of digital circuits. A common limitation facing many fault detection schemes
is that the failure detector itself may fail.

A fault involving the checker may be

undetectable or result in the corruption of otherwise valid outputs.

Traditional

approaches to fault-detection typically rely on coding-based schemes or redundancy
using a single voter, comparator, or error detector. Those fault checkers possess a single
point-of-failure exposure involving the detector elements, or must rely upon special testvectors or data encodings to isolate them. Detector components in the reliability path
have been referred to as golden elements [22] because the fault-handling strategy relies
on them to be fault-free. The following sections develop an alternative approach to selfchecking fault detection based on random pairings and temporal voting to reduce such
exposures.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Fault-Detection Techniques

Table 4.1 lists characteristics of selected fault-handling strategies. Specialized encoding
schemes are often required by CED approaches as opposed to TMR and the Discrepancy
Mirror methods which do not. The number of functional logic elements required by
TMR is greater than that of the other schemes. Discrepancy Mirrors provide inherent
transient fault coverage with minimal detection latency. They also support fine-grained
resolution of the fault location, without interruption to the data throughput flow when a
fault occurs. Thus, Discrepancy Mirrors offer improved detection of permanent and
transient faults, with reduced time and space overheads. Section 4.3 provides the design
of the discrepancy mirror approach.

Results of simulations and fault location

experiments conducted in the case study are given in Section 4.4.
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4.3. Designing a Discrepancy Mirror – Case Study
The Discrepancy Mirror approach is a duplex redundancy technique that utilizes alternate
physical configurations from a population of candidate designs that are functionally
equivalent. As shown in Figure 4.1, the technique is composed of three phases, namely
Selection, Detection, and Preference Adjustment.

The Selection phase selects two

candidates, each of which utilize mutually exclusive subsets of the resources under test.
The Detection process uses the Discrepancy Mirror logic shown in Figure 4.2 to check
for bit-wise equivalence between outputs of the candidates as described below. The
Preference Adjustment phase utilizes the results of successive comparisons to update the
pairing strategy during subsequent selections. These steps will be explained below in the
context of a FPGA-based realization whereby two configurations of the functional logic
are loaded in tandem.

Figure 4.1: Discrepancy Mirror-based Scheme
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Figure 4.2: Discrepancy Detection Circuit

4.3.1. Selection Phase
Candidate designs are selected from a population developed at design time, either
manually or via a CAD tool. Random pairings or an adaptive scheme based on the
results of Preference Adjustment can be employed. This process is identified as Step 1 in
Figure 4.1. The selected designs are then loaded as the active configurations during Step
2 and Step 3. Identical input operands are applied in parallel to each configuration and
the outputs are redundantly computed for comparison in the next phase.

4.3.2. Detection Phase
As shown in Step 4 in Figure 4.1, the discrepancy mirror circuit is used to identify
whether the outputs of the two configurations under test agree. A complete instance of
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the discrepancy mirror is obtained whenever two configurations are loaded, since the
discrepancy detector consists of two identical sections as shown in Figure 4.2. Assertion
of MATCH output from the discrepancy mirror indicates the absence of a single-fault in
the configurations under test, as well as the logic in the discrepancy mirror. The data
output is enabled if and only if no faults are detected as shown in Step 5 in Figure 4.1.

The inputs to the Discrepancy Mirror shown in Figure 4.2 as “Function Output A” and
“Function Output B” are generated independently. If there is a fault in a resource utilized
by either of these configurations, then a discrepancy is observed at the output. The truth
table shown in Table 2 describes the operation of the circuit shown in Figure 4.2.
Outputs from the function configurations A and B are applied as inputs to both the
XNOR gates. The output from each XNOR gate acts as the ENABLE signal for the tristate buffer in the same half, as well as the input to the tri-state buffer in the other half of
the discrepancy mirror. The tri-state buffer outputs are tied together to form a Wired-OR
connection which provides the MATCH output signal. The pull-down transistors hold
the signal to a logic ‘0’ level when the tri-state buffer output is in a high-impedance state.
In an active-high non-inverting tri-state buffer, the input is buffered at the output only
when the ENABLE signal is high. When the ENABLE signal is low, the output of the
buffer is in a high-impedance state.

A CMOS model of the discrepancy detector was created using PSpice. The circuit was
constructed using 44 p- and n-channel MOS transistors with a 1.5 micron minimum
width, and a 600nm length. The width of the p-mos transistors was set to thrice the width
of the n-mos transistors. Figure 4.3 below shows the PSpice schematic and Figure 4.4
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shows the transient response of the circuit demonstrating that the circuit conforms to
specifications enabling the correct identification of discrepancies. Subsequently, the
circuit was also simulated on the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA using the ModelSim-II
simulator.

Figure 4.3 Discrepancy Detector Circuit Schematic Layout
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Figure 4.4 Transient Response of the CMOS Discrepancy Detector Circuit
As listed in Table 4.2, the response of the circuit is robust to several possible fault
scenarios. If either of the XNOR gates fail, then one of the two tri-state buffers will be
disabled and the other will have an input of zero, thus MATCH will be a ‘0’, signifying
discrepancy. If the tri-state buffers fail, producing a high impedance output, the pull
down resistors in the circuit will hold the signal to ‘0’. The wired-OR connection reduces
single points of failure to a stuck-at fault exposure for the MATCH output.
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Table 4.2: Discrepancy Mirror Truth Table

4.3.3. The Preference Adjustment Process
Step 6 and Step 7 comprise the Preference Adjustment process. When the Discrepancy
Mirror returns a MATCH output, alternate configurations can be loaded for testing or the
resident fault-free configurations can be used. The output from the discrepancy mirror
over a period of time indicates the relative fitness of the different configurations. This
information can isolate the fault location and aid in regeneration of lost functionality
through the identification of alternate resources. The cumulative discrepancy information
from diverse pairings over time can be used in Step 7 to modify the selection preferences
for the configurations in the population.

4.4. Analysis of Fault Isolation with a Simplified Articulation Model
The operation of the discrepancy mirror circuit was verified on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro
FPGA platform using ModelSim-II. The pull-down resistors were emulated using digital
components as shown in the Xilinx data sheet [44]. The waveform for the MATCH
output was asserted whenever the inputs to the discrepancy mirror were in agreement.
The simulation waveform showed a LOW signal whenever the MATCH output was a ‘0’.
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In the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA, when pull-down resistors are emulated, a LOW signal
is the equivalent of a logic-0 output. The circuit was also simulated using Cadence
SPICE. The entire circuit was also realized using a total of 44 p- and n-channel MOS
transistors using a 1.5 micron minimum width technology with a length of 600 nm. A
total of 44 CMOS transistors were utilized to realize the circuit. The widths of the pMOS
transistors in the XNOR circuit were selected to be thrice the widths of the nMOS
transistors to shape the waveform rise and fall times, to develop the required timing
characteristics.

The simulation results and waveforms obtained indicated behavior

conforming to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Discrepancy Mirror Fault Coverage and Response

Two sets of experiments were performed to analyze the fault isolation latency. Both
experiments sought identify the number of iterations required to identify the faulty
resource in the case of single fault. A simulator was constructed using a C-language
program for simulating the Selection, Detection, and Preference Adjustment phases. The
inputs to the simulated mirror were obtained using random number generators. Random
input values were applied to two configurations chosen at random from the pool of
competing configurations. More formally, let U denote the set consisting of all the logic
resources in the FPGA, S denote the pool of resources suspected of being faulty, and
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Ci ⊂ U denote the set of resources used by the ith configuration. Initially, |S| = |U|. A
process of m successive intersections among the subsets Cj ∩ Ck=j (i ≤ j, k ≤· m) are
performed. Each successive intersection reduces |S| until after the mth intersection at time
t = m eventually |S| = 1, completing the fault-location process. Each experiment was
conducted with |U| = 1,000, 10,000, and 100,000. The expected number of iterations to
isolate the fault are reported for the mean values observed over 100 trials of the
simulator. An individual logic resource is the equivalent of a CLB in an FPGA so the
range of resource pool sizes reflect a realistic device scenario.

In the first set of experiments, the inputs applied consistently articulate any fault in the
logic resources used by the configurations under test. Thus, a match output indicates that
the logic resources used by the configurations being compared are completely fault-free.
A discrepancy between the configurations’ functional outputs indicates the presence of at
least one resource fault. Assertion of the MATCH output exonerates all logic resources
currently being used, and a de-assertion of the MATCH output implicates the subset of
logic resources currently being used as suspect. The faulty resource is isolated after m
pairings through a process of successive intersection.

Figure 4.3 shows the faulty

resource can be identified using an expected value of 11.1 pairings when |U| = 1,000 and
half of the resources are utilized by each configuration. When |U| = 100,000, the mean
number of pairings required to locate the fault increases by much less than a factor of ten
to a value of 17.6. Under more demanding parameters, when |U| =100,000, and when
only 5% of the resources are being used by each configuration, a mean value of 63.7
pairings are required to isolate the faulty resource.
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Figure 4.5: Fault Isolation with Perpetually Articulating Inputs
Depending on the inputs applied, the fault in the functional logic under test may remain
dormant and thus some inputs would not articulate a visible discrepancy. In this case, a
match output from the discrepancy mirror cannot evaluate whether all the resources under
test are fault-free. A discrepant output is a definitive indicator of the existence of a
single-fault. With such Intermittently Articulating Inputs, the discrepancy mirror based
scheme requires additional random pairings to isolate the single-fault. As shown in
Figure 4.4, when |U| = 1, 000, with resource utilization at 45%, an expected 42 random
pairings are required to uniquely identify the faulty resource. When |U| = 100, 000, the
best performance is observed for a utilization of near 50%, where the expected value of
random pairings is 64.1.
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Figure 4.6: Fault Isolation with Intermittently Articulating Inputs
The discrepancy mirror is capable of handling faults in either the functional logic or the
detector. If there is a failure in either, then the output of the mirror remains de-asserted
indicating the presence of at least one resource fault. It is able to isolate the faulty
resources with a expected number of random pairings that is sub-linear in the number of
resources under test. It does not depend upon a specific coding scheme or a pre-defined
set of inputs. Random pairings of configurations perform successive intersection of the
resources under test to isolate the faulty resource. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show that
more pairings are required to identify the faulty resource when the utilization of available
resources is below 20% or above 80%. In these situations, each successive pairing
implicates (or exonerates) a smaller sub-set of resources than when half of the resources
are utilized. Finally, using a discrepancy mirror based approach, the number of pairings
required for fault location increases sub-linearly with an increase in |U|. For example, at
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50% utilization, the expected number of pairings to locate a fault within pools of 1,000,
10,000, and 100,000 resources are 11.1, 14.9, and 17.6, respectively, demonstrating the
viability of the technique. Though the model is abstract, and of minimal complexity, the
case-study demonstrates the viability of the discrepancy detector, and provides the basis
for investigating group testing-based approaches to FPGA fault isolation.

There are certain cases where the simple fault isolation scheme described above may fail
to converge on a single faulty resource. A trivial case is when all the resources available
on the FPGA are used by each configuration. If the application demands that all the
resources be used, then isolation cannot occur through the process of successive
intersection. Also, in cases where a very low number of resources are used by individual
configurations, it is possible that none of the individuals utilize the faulty resource,
leading to the state where no discrepancies will be observed. The most challenging case
is when multiple individuals utilize the faulty resource. In this situation, the history
matrix elements corresponding to the intersection of the subset of resources used by these
individuals will have no relative differences, and will all have the highest value.
Successive intersections between the resource subsets will not lead to any further fault
isolation. For example, with a resource utilization of 40% in a device with 40,000 unit
resources, isolation proceeds as shown in Figure 4.5. The isolation cannot be completed,
and after about 23 iterations, the number of suspected faulty elements stays a constant at
36. Any further isolation cannot occur since there is none of the intersections that may
follow provide any additional isolation information. This necessitates an algorithm based
on group testing.
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Figure 4.7: Successive Isolation as Input Iterations Increase

4.5. Fault Isolation using Halving and Column-Swapping
To avoid the problem of not being able to proceed with isolation in certain cases where
successive iterations do not provide isolation information, a dueling algorithm is
proposed which tries to emulate halving. Halving is the process of successively reducing
the size of the subgroup under test by half until, finally a test of a single element is
required to identify the faulty element.

The algorithm works by swapping columns in the configurations of individual elements.
When the fault isolation process approaches a state of stasis, some of the columns in the
individuals are swapped. The number of columns to be swapped is determined by
considering the number of resources currently suspected of being faulty. A number of
columns equal to half of the remaining number of suspect elements are swapped with
other columns in the same individual. This will introduce new information, as some of
the suspected faulty elements used by the individual earlier will no longer be used, for
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example. Swapping is restricted only to the columns to facilitate future implementation
in FPGA hardware. As shown in Figure 4.6, isolation proceeds till a single faulty
element is isolated under the same conditions under which the results shown in Figure

Number of Suspected Faulty Elements (log)

4.5, for dueling without swapping were obtained.
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Figure 4.8: Isolation Progress when Halving is used
In order to analyze the behavior of the dueling algorithm with modified halving, further
experiments were conducted to see the implications of various factors on the isolation
process. In each of the following experiments, the population size specifies the number
of competing individual configurations in the population. Resource utilization, expressed
as a percentage signifies the amount of available resources used by an application
implemented on the FPGA. The FPGA device is simulated by using a square matrix of
order n where n denotes the number of rows and columns in the device. Each of the
experiments that follow list average values observed over 100 experimental trials.
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The effect of the size of the isolation problem was evaluated by applying the proposed
technique to simulated FPGAs of various array sizes. As shown in Figure 4.7, for an
isolation problem where there are 100 rows and columns, or 10000 elements, only an
average of 14.3 iterations are required to isolate a single fault. As the size of the array
containing the fault increases, the increase in the required number of iterations is
minimal. For example, for the difficult case where there is a single fault in 1 million
resources, the algorithm requires only an average of 27.4 iterations to isolate the fault,

Average Number of Iterations For Fault Isolation

showing that the algorithm scales well with the size of problem.
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Figure 4.9: Isolation Performance as a Function of the Total Number of Elements
As the population size increases, fault isolation is expected to become faster, since more
information will be available to the algorithm from the increased population size.
However, a very high population size may lead to more individuals being affected by the
same fault. As shown in Figure 4.8, the number of iterations required for isolation, with
40000 elements, and 50% resource utilization shows a tendency to decrease with an
increase in the population size. For a population of size 60, only an average of 17.2
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iterations are required for isolation. Practically, however, a very high population size will
imply the need for a higher number of alternative individual configurations.

A

population size of 30 seems to be an ideal tradeoff between ease of isolation, and the

Average Number of Iterations for Fault Isolation

difficulty of generating increased number of individuals.
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Figure 4.10: Isolation Performance as a Function of the Population Size

4.6. Isolating Embedded Cores using Group Testing
Although group testing-based methods are primarily presented as a tool to improve upon
existing run-time fault isolation techniques, they are also amenable to post-manufacturing
testing of FPGAs. In this chapter a specific example of using group testing techniques to
accelerate the isolation of faulty embedded cores in FPGAs is presented.

The current generation of 65 nm FPGAs by Xilinx, such as the Virtex-5 platform FPGAs
introduce space-efficient hard IP cores implemented using the column-based Application
Specific Modular Block (ASMBL) architecture. The Virtex-5 platform provides anywhere
from 32 to 640 embedded DSP48E cores across a range of devices [45]. These cores are
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designed, placed, and routed into the fabric of the FPGA, and have been characterized
and verified to optimize performance. Unlike soft IP cores, these enable designers to
utilize the Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) as general-purpose logic resources and
minimize the space and power required to implement DSP applications on FPGAs. The
embedded IP cores are characterized by their predictable timing and are optimized to
work efficiently in a manner independent of the rest of the design. These cores are highly
customizable based on the designers requirements and provide a range of in-built
structures for efficient arithmetic calculation and signal processing requirements. All
these characteristics lend to more efficient implementation of an entire system on an
FPGA known commonly as a System On Programmable Chip (SOPC). The development
of FPGAs with an increasing number of embedded hard IP cores drives the need for
faster testing methods for failures in the cores.

The embedded cores are distributed throughout the FPGA fabric and as an integral part of
the computational resources, these require extensive post-manufacturing testing and
verification. It is therefore important to develop testing methods to identify hardware
faults with minimal latency and resource overheads.

4.6.1. BIST-based Testing of Embedded FPGA Cores
Advances in FPGA production technologies have improved capabilities to the point
where FPGAs have dedicated embedded cores, in addition to multiplexers and Block
RAMs. The most widely accepted approach to detect faults at the chip level in VLSI is to
apply BIST on the components [46-48]. The built-in nature of BIST also allows testing
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the chip in a variety of working environments. In BIST both the Test Pattern Generation
(TPG) and Output Response Analyzer (ORA) are incorporated inside the chip. Assuming
that all levels of the hierarchy use BIST, each element can test itself and transmits the
result to the succeeding level in the hierarchy. BIST also increases controllability and
observability by providing access to the internal nodes since tester logic is located on the
chip. BIST allows tests to be run at system speed and eliminates this gap.

BIST has been the choice of convention for testing Embedded Memory [46, 47].
Conventional ASIC BIST techniques typically accrue between 10% to 30% area
overhead and delay penalties [48]. Therefore, it is essential that the FPGA core test
method leverages the reprogrammability inherent in FPGAs. An additional advantage of
utilizing the programmable feature of an FPGA to test itself is that BIST logic can be
removed when the circuit is reconfigured for another use and testability is achieved
without permanent area overhead or performance degradation.

There has been considerable research on developing and applying BIST techniques for
programmable logic resources in an FPGA including CLBs [49, 50] and interconnect
matrix of routing resource [16, 51].

Abramovici and Stroud [49] presented BIST

architecture to test CLBs in an FPGA. In their scheme, a column or (a row) of CLB is
configured to generate pseudo-exhaustive test patterns to alternating columns of
identically configured CLBs under test. They use two identical TPGs to detect any fault
in the CLBs used to construct TPGs. Comparator-based ORAs monitor the output of the
BUTs and latch mismatches due to faults. The BUTs are tested and configured for
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different modes of operation. Each complete test (session) covers only half of the CLBs
and another session is required to test the other half.

The diagnostic procedure called MULTICELLO (Multiple faulty Cell Locator)
developed by Abramovici et al., identifies faulty BUTs based on the failing BIST results.
Stroud and Garimella [52] targeted multiple regular structure cores including memories
and multipliers and developed a diagnostic procedure based on the extension of the
MULTICELLO algorithm. The diagnostic procedure is performed in five steps. They
presented a BIST approach in which neighboring blocks are compared by a set of ORAs.
Thus, each core is observed by two sets of ORAs and is compared to two different cores.
Circular comparison of the first and last block covers the corner block. Following and
applying the MULTICELLO algorithm, Garimella and Stroud [53] presented
development of an automated BIST generation for embedded Block RAMs in an FPGA,
based on parameterized VHDL model. The MULTICELLO algorithm provides a good
diagnostic resolution and is able to locate the faulty blocks (unless all blocks have
equivalent faults). However, it is not applicable when testing a set of two blocks in
cascade mode. For example, in many applications and operations it is required that two
DSP blocks cascaded together to produce the final outputs. In this case, they produce
different outputs and therefore it is not possible to compare the outputs of neighboring
blocks.

Renovell et al. [54] present a method to test the LUT/RAM modules of FPGAs using a
minimal number of test configuration by proposing a model architecture with N inputs
and 2N memory cells. With a unique test configuration, they test a single module by
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extending conventional algorithms for testing SRAM modules such as the March tests
[55]. They also propose a unique test configuration called pseudo shift register. In this
method, the circuit operates as a shift register and the MATS++ algorithm is adapted to
test the FPGA RAM modules. However this method is limited to the SRAM modules on
the FPGA, or the LUTS operating in the SRAM mode. Current state-of-the-art FPGAs
such as the Spartan-3a DSP FPGAs from Xilinx offer embedded SoPC DSP modules that
include dedicated 18×18 multipliers along with 18-bit pre-adder and 48-bit postadder/accumulations and dedicated DSP circuitry consisting of DSP48A slices [56].

Earlier Sarvi et al [57] developed a diagnostic method to detect and locate faulty
embedded cores in FPGAs using BIST was developed.

However, the technique

configures the device twice in order to complete fault isolation. The method partitions
the cores on an FPGA into two groups and conducts BIST on each of these groups. Fault
isolation is achieved by comparing the results of the two tests. Under this scheme the
two configurations are constructed to enable isolation by comparison. In post-processing,
defectives are identified by analyzing the results of comparisons among blocks enclosed
within the same group. However, this method fails to isolate faulty blocks when there is
a defective block in each of the compared pairs.

Improvement over previous approaches is attained using an automated diagnostic
methodology that is applicable to different cores, including DSP cores, that takes into
account the different modes of operation such as cascade and direct. The group-testing
enhanced method is scalable to different FPGA families including the Xilinx XtremeDSP
products and the Virtex-5 family of FPGAs. Further, these techniques can be easily
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extended to provide testing coverage for new families of embedded cores on FPGAs
since the method is core-independent. A significant improvement is the one-shot testing
of all embedded cores of a specified type using a single test pattern. Group testing
techniques are utilized to generate a non-adaptive testing regimen that involves a single
group of tests executed concurrently. The test provides complete coverage for all cores
of a type on the chip by dividing the cores-under-test into subsets with a cardinality of
four. By generating, comparing and encoding the outputs produced by the cores in
response to the test pattern, complete fault resolution is achieved in a single test.

4.6.2. Enhancing Embedded Core BIST using Group Testing Techniques
The embedded IP cores in the Xilinx Virtex-5 family of devices are distributed evenly
throughout the fabric ensuring optimal timing. The BIST technique proposed in this
article utilizes the CLBs adjacent to the embedded cores to realize the TPG and the ORA.
Each embedded core comprises a BUT. The current generation Virtex-5 FPGAs from
Xilinx include embedded cores in the form of 36-Kbit Block dual-port Block RAMs and
Advanced DSP48E slices. The DSP48E slices provide a range of functionality such as
two’s complement, multiplication, and optional adder, subtracter, and accumulator.
These also provide pipelining and dedicated cascade connections.

The number of

DSP48E slices in the Virtex-5 FPGAs varies from 32 in the XC5VLX30 device to 640 in
the XC5VSX95T device. In the experiments described here, the DSP48E slices are the
blocks under test.
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Under the proposed group testing-based technique, the m embedded cores on the device
are divided into m/4 = n groups of BUTs. Tests are conducted on these groups to provide
fault isolation in a single-stage, non-adaptive group testing regimen. Comparators kn
generate a PASS/FAIL result based on discrepancies between the outputs of two of the
BUTs. For a group of 4 BUTs, a total of six comparators are required to compare each
BUT’s output with that of all the other BUTs in the same group. For purposes of
simplicity, Figure 4.10 shows the replicable BIST model in its smallest scale, considering
one such group of 4 BUTs, numbered B0 through B3. It is assumed that the CLBs and
routing resources have been tested for correct functionality.

Figure 4.11: BIST Structure for Testing a Group of Four Blocks Under Test
The TPG is realized using an FSM to realize the states required for testing the embedded
cores. In order to test the DSP48E cores, the FSM generates 400 states and 14-bit wide
control signals for each state. The control signal bits are comprised of a 7-bit opmode
signal, a 3-bit carryin_sel signal, and a 4-bit wide alumode signal. These serve as control
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inputs to each of the DSP48E embedded cores. For each of the 400 states, the FSM
generates valid combinations of these 14 control signals which define the function
implemented on the DSP48E at any given clock signal. The FSM is optimized via XST
into one 512x17 ROM and a 14-bit registered output. This ROM is realized as one of the
embedded BRAM cores which is pre-defined through initialization. State-transitions are
performed via a 9-bit adder, whose output is registered using a 9-bit register. The three
data operands for the DSP48E cores are generated using one 18-bit Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR), one 48-bit LFSR and one 30-bit LFSR.

Each pair of BUTs requires a 48-bit comparator and 4 1-bit comparators for their outputs
to be compared for discrepancies. In addition to these, for each pair of BUTs, a 2×1
multiplexer is used to serialize the results of the comparators. Thus for every group of
BUTs, a total of six 2×1 multiplexers are required. This circuitry is further optimized as
described in the following section. Figure 2 shows these six comparators k1(i,j) for
comparing the outputs of the 4 BUTs in group n = 1. technique uses a test controller in
addition to the TPG and the ORA, to activate the test routine by asserting the START
signal. Termination of the test is achieved when the DONE signal is asserted, followed
by the propagation of the test results.

4.6.3. Embedded Core Fault Isolation Experiments on Virtex-5 FPGAs
As a particular example of the BIST technique, experiments were conducted on the
Virtex-5 family of Xilinx FPGAs. The testing of an XC5VLX30 device provides the
following case study which further elaborates the procedure. The XC5VLX30 device
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consists of 36 DSP48E embedded cores, with 4800 slices that provide 19200 LUTs. The
m = 36 embedded cores on the XC5VLX30 device are divided into n = 8 groups. Since

six 2-to-1 multiplexers are required for each group, a total of 48 such multiplexers are
required. However, the synthesized design optimally uses six 8-to-1 multiplexers.

Figure 4.12: BIST Structure used for Testing the XC5VLX30 Device
A block diagram of the scheme is shown in Figure 4.11. As shown in the figure, a total
of six multiplexers and flip flops, numbered muxo through mux5 and FFo through FF5
are utilized. There are six columns of comparators, with each column consisting of eight
comparators, k0 through k7. Comparators kn(i,j), 0 ≤ i,j ≤ 3,∀ i ≠ j complete the test for a
group of four BUTs as shown in Figure 2. The results for comparisons among one group
of BUTs, for example, the results from k0(0,1), k0(0,2), k0(0,3), k0(1,2), k0(1,3) and k0(2,3)
are registered in the flip flops FF0 through FF5.. This is then repeated for the other
groups, using the 3-bit counter to enable the succeeding inputs of each multiplexer.
Thus, at the end of each test, when the inputs from the TPG have been applied, the
counter goes through all the multiplexer inputs and sending the output of the six flip flops
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simultaneously to 6 1-bit outputs. The fault diagnosis script then processes the results of
each set of 6 outputs to resolve the location of the defective BUTs. This can lead to
isolation of faults in any two of the four BUTs in each group, irrespective of the location
of the faulty BUTs within each group.
Table 4.4: Resource Utilization Results from Experiments Conducted on the Xilinx
Virtex-5 Family of FPGAs

Device

DSP48E

Available
Slices

Available
LUTs

Available
FFs

XC5VLX30
XC5VLX50
XC5VLX85
XC5VLX110
XC5VLX155
XC5VLX220
XC5VLX330
XC5VSX35T
XC5VSX50T
XC5VSX95T

32
48
48
64
128
128
192
192
288
640

4800
7200
12960
17280
24320
34560
51840
5440
8160
14720

19200
28800
51840
69120
97280
138240
207360
21760
32640
58880

19200
28800
51840
69120
97280
138240
207360
21760
32640
58880

Resource Utilization under
Test (Percentage)
LUTs
Flip flops
1,418 (7%)
384 (2%)
1862 (6%)
408 (1%)
1862 (6%)
408 (1%)
2300 (3%)
432 (1%)
4058 (4%)
528 (1%)
4058 (2%)
528 (1%)
5822 (2%)
624 (1%)
5822 (26%)
624 (2%)
8462 (25%)
768 (2%)
18139 (30%)
1296 (2%)

The solution was implemented on various devices of the Virtex-5 family. Table 4.4
summarizes the resource usage for each of these devices. As listed in the Table, for the
XC5VSX95T device, which contains 640 DSP48E embedded cores, the device utilization
during testing is approximately 30%. In Table 4.4, all Utilization Percentage figures less
than 1% have been rounded up to 1%. Also, each Slice in the Virtex-5 family of FPGAs
contains four LUTs and four flip flops.
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Embedded cores within FPGAs provide improved performance by optimizing area and
power consumption.

With improvements in the process technology, the smaller

geometries will drive the inclusion of an increasing number of diverse hard IP blocks in
FPGAs.

As shown in this article, the XC5VSX95T device in the Virtex-5 family

contains 640 DSP cores and 488 Block RAM cores. This shows the need for efficient
fault isolation techniques to diagnose these devices to improve yields and facilitate faster
debugging. The demonstrated technique achieves the goal of fast detection and isolation
of faults by leveraging a group testing technique that isolates faulty embedded cores in a
single-step procedure that precludes the need for device reconfiguration. The approach is
scalable at the cost of area overhead. However, no permanent area cost or performance
overheads are incurred as a result of testing. This technique can be used in conjunction
with other existing methods for isolating faults in interconnect and CLBs to provide
complete post-manufacturing testing for FPGAs with embedded cores.

4.7. Improving GA Performance Using CGT
The fault isolation provided by Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) can be utilized to
accelerate the design and repair process in a genetic algorithm. To demonstrate the
benefit using an example, A CGT-pruned GA was developed [58] to evaluate the
performance benefit obtained by using the halving testing scheme. As shown in Figure
4.13, the simulator for the CGT-Pruned GA optionally uses a seed configuration and uses
the resource information provided by the CGT technique to effect refurbishment in faulty
configurations using the GA. The simulator is a C++ based console application that
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consists of two main components: the CGT procedure and the GA. The CGT algorithm
uses the Gnu Scientific Library (GSL) and simulates the fault location method. The GA is
implemented using an object oriented architecture that contains classes which model the
FPGA resources with flexible geometries such as the Configurable Logic Block (CLB)
and Look-Up Table (LUT) classes, and others that model the GA such as Individual and
Generation classes. When this simulator is run in the CGT-pruned GA mode, the CGT
component simulates the desired FPGA chip and obtains resource performance
information which is an input to the GA. The GA then performs evolutionary design or
reads the Seed Configuration file and performs evolutionary repair according to the active
mode of operation. In the Conventional GA mode, the CGT component is not invoked
and no resource performance information is available to the GA.

Figure 4.13: CGT-Pruned GA Simulator
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Table 4.5: CGT-Pruned GA - Repair Performance

Experiment Type
Circuit
Number of
Experiments
Arithmetic Mean
(Generations)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of the
Mean
68% Confidence
Interval

Conventional
Repair
3-bit x 2-bit
Multiplier

CGT-pruned
Repair
3-bit x 2-bit
Multiplier

30

30

17150

10700

15650

12550

2850

2300

[14300 → 20000]

[8400 → 13000]

In the experiments, a 3-bit × 2-bit multiplier is circuit evolved from seed configurations,
and in the repair experiments, functional circuit representations with a simulated fault are
repaired. The optimized GA parameters used were a mutation rate of 0.05, a crossover
rate of 0.4, and a population size of 25. Further, elitism was imposed where the two bestfit configurations from a generation were propagated to the next generation.

The

simulated FPGA architecture consisted of 15 CLBs configured with a strict feed-forward
topology. As listed in Table 4.5, with a single stuck-at fault, the CGT-pruned GA
outperformed a GA unassisted by the results of group testing in the experiment
concerning the repair of individuals affected by the fault. Over 30 trials, the CGT-pruned
GA required an average of 10700 generations to realize a repair as opposed to 17150
generations for the non CGT-pruned GA. Further the result ranges do not overlap at the
68% confidence interval, which makes the result more statistically significant.
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CHAPTER 5: LOGIC ELEMENT ISOLATION USING
AUTONOMOUS GROUP TESTING

The logic resources on a Xilinx FPGA device are organized as a two-dimensional array
of CLBs [59]. Each CLB consists of 4 slices, which in turn contain two 4-input LUTs.
In the AGT-based fault isolation method described, a logic resource refers to a slice in
the FPGA. As shown in Figure 5.1, the FPGA is seen as a two-dimensional array of
resources, each resource being a slice. The fault model accounts for stuck-at faults at the
inputs of one of the two LUTs in a slice specified by its (x,y) coordinate pair.

FPGA
Processor
Core
SLICE

LUTs

Figure 5.1: FPGA Resources as Seen by the Group Testing Algorithm

5.1. Terminology and Nomenclature for Analysis of Autonomous Group Testing
Techniques
Let R denote the set of all resources ri(x,y) ∈ R under test as specified by their (x,y)
coordinates.

A set of functionally-equivalent logic configurations, C, consisting of
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subsets ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ p, where p quantifies the size of a population of design configurations.
Each configuration realizes the combinatorial logic required for the application.

The population preset value ppreset determines the maximum number of individuals in a
generation so that pstage ≤ ppreset as testing progresses. At each stage of the adaptive
testing algorithm, the configurations in the population are replaced by new designs,
creating a new generation of individuals.

T denotes the set of binary input vectors applied and ti ∈ T are the individual input
vectors. These inputs to the implemented combinatorial logic are also the test vectors for
the isolation procedure. Let the function implemented on the FPGA be denoted by
F(T, ci). If any of the resources in ci used to realize F(T, ci) are faulty, then the response

will deviate from the correct realization, for some subset T’ ⊂ T which articulate the
fault as follows:

Definition 5.1. The syndrome T’ of a configuration ci is the set of positive tests for the
configuration.

Definition 5.2. The discrepancy function D(T’, cj) yields a set of all outputs that are not
equal to the correct output, as realized when tests comprising the syndrome, T’ are
applied to configuration cj. Tests T’ ⊂ T on a subset cj are positive if and only if
D(T’, cj) ≠ {}, and negative otherwise.
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Definition 5.3. The articulation rate a(ci) for a configuration ci is the ratio of the number
of incorrect outputs to the cardinality of the entire output space:

Articulation rate, a(ci) =

| T '|
.
|T |

(5.1)

Since the articulation rate cannot controlled by the designer, it introduces randomness
into the rate of progress of fault isolation as discussed in section 6.2. Fault isolation
proceeds by reducing the cardinality of the set of suspects, S. S is defined as the
intersection of resources ri(x,y) ∈ ci used by all ci ∀ D(T’, ci) ≠ {}. The set of all viable
resources tenable to creating fault-free configurations is denoted by S , such that

S ∪ S = R.

Definition 5.4. Forward Progress is made, if, as fault isolation proceeds, |S| decreases
and | S | decreases, until finally |S| = d, the number of known defectives.

As fault isolation progresses |S| decreases and | S | increases, until finally |S| = d, the
number of known defectives.

Definition 5.5. The defect scouring ratio, d(stage) defines the ratio of number of known
suspects |S| to | S |, given the number of test stages that have been completed:

d(stage) =
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|S|
|S|

(5.2)

5.2. Autonomous Group Testing Algorithm Overview
As shown in Figure 5.2, the AGT algorithm comprises of three phases of fault isolation
which occur after the fault has been detected. First, in the initialization phase, all
elements of the History Matrix, H, described in Section 5.3, are initialized to zero. In
addition, since the isolation procedure is yet to begin, the set of suspect resources, S is
equal to the set of resources under test, R. After initialization, the pstage configurations
that comprise the first testing stage are created, which forms the second phase of the
algorithm. The third phase consists of performing tests on the configuration thus created.
Phases 2 and 3 are repeated until the defective resource is isolated.

Before the configurations for a stage are created in phase 2, the equal share factor, nshare,
and the population size, pstage, are determined as described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5,
respectively. Once nshare is known, the pstage individuals that comprise the first test stage
are created using the Fault Injection and Analysis Toolkit (FIAT) described in Section
5.9. During the fault isolation phase shown in Figure 5.2, isolation proceeds by applying
random test vectors which emulate the input data stream to randomly selected
configurations that comprise the first test stage. This process continues until stasis is
attained, as described in Section 5.6. After the system attains stasis, a new testing stage is
created, and fault isolation is pursued until the defective resource is identified.
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Initialize H(x,y) = 0

Initialize
Initialize S = R
stage++
Determine nshare

Create New
Testing Stage

Determine p
Create p configurations
test++

Select configuration
ci at random

Conduct One
Stage of Tests

Apply randomly selected
input, tj to ci

Discrepancy ?

Yes

Update H Matrix

No

Defective Isolated ?

Yes

No
No

Stasis Reached ?

END

Yes

Figure 5.2: AGT Process Flow

5.3. Tracking Defectives Using the History Matrix
The history matrix, H, keeps track of the discrepancy counts of the resources. As shown
in Figure 5.2, all elements in the H matrix are initialized to zero. As a stage of tests
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proceeds, for each test ti for which D(ti, cj) ≠ {}, all H matrix entries H(x,y) are
incremented by one where (x,y) are the coordinates of all ri(x,y) ∈ cj. Over time, the
maximal elements in H identify suspect resources by their coordinates. Under a singlefault assumption, fault isolation is complete when a unique maximum can be identified in
H. The defective resource will be identified by the coordinates of the maximal element in
H.

5.4. The Equal Sharing Test Group Formation Strategy
Initially, S = R, since no information is available regarding the fitness of any of the
resources. The algorithm proceeds in stages, with a new generation of individuals being
created in each stage. In each stage, the members of S are equally shared among the
configurations ci, 0 < i < pstage-1 in the generation.

The remaining nreqd resources required to realize the design are randomly selected from
the set S which has a cardinality |R| - |S|. Thus each individual ci will be allocated |R| |S| + |S|/pstage resources. Hence if the number of suspects |S| is small enough such
that |R| - |S| + |S|/ pstage > nreqd , then the configurations in that group will have mutually
exclusive shares of the suspect resources, with each individual configuration ci being
allocated exclusive resources rj(x,y) ∈ ci , rj(x,y) ∉ ck, where 0 < k < pstage-1. Otherwise,
some suspect resources need to be shared among the configurations to meet the
application resource demand nreqd. The maximum cardinality of |S| such that mutually
exclusive shares of suspect resources are possible, denoted by |Smax| can be obtained by
evaluating the following expression:
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| R | − | S max | +

| S max |
= nreqd ,
p preset

(5.3)

which yields:

| S max |=

p preset
(1 − p preset )

× (nreqd − | R |)

(5.4)

If |S| > |Smax| then the equal share factor, nshare, is derived by rearranging Equation(5.5) to
yield Equation(6.6):

nreqd =| R | − | S | + nshare

(5.5)

n share = nreqd − | R | + | S |

(5.6)

Figure 5.3 shows an example of how |S| = 30 suspect resources from among |R| = 100
resources are shared among pstage = 2 configurations. In case 1, nreqd = 85, yielding |Smax|
= 30 using Equation(6.4). Since |S| = |Smax| in this scenario, configurations c0 and c1 use
mutually exclusive subsets of S, and they both use all ri(x,y) ∈ S to satisfy the
application resource demand. In scenario 2, however, nreqd = 91, and thus, |Smax| = 18.
Since |S| > |Smax|, the equal share factor is evaluated using Equation(6.6) to be nshare = 21.
As shown for case 2 in Figure 5.3, c0 and c1 share |S| - 2 × nshare = 12 suspect resources.

100

Alternative resource allocation strategies can be adopted to replace the equal share
strategy. For instance, in [60], an Interleaved Allocation strategy is proposed that ensures
that each LUT in the Suspect pool is used by more than one individual in every new
stage. This will reduce the probability that a faulty LUT does not articulate the fault for
the observed test vectors. The strategy uses a Coverage Factor to determine the number
of different individuals that utilize any suspect resource. The interleaved allocation
scheme adopts a low-risk approach by covering each suspected resource with two or
more configurations, making it less probable that a group of testing yields no
improvement.
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S

y

Scenario 1: nreqd = 85

2

1

3

2
x

|R| = 100, |S| = 30, pstage = 2
Region 1 : All suspect resources, S
Region 2 : Suspect resources unused
by configuration ci
Region 3 : Resources used by
configuration ci
Region 4 : Suspect resources shared
by c0 and c1

Configuration c0

3
Configuration c1

Scenario 2: nreqd = 91

4
2

3

Configuration c0

2
4

Configuration c1

Figure 5.3: Sharing the Suspect Resources Equally – Two Different Scenarios
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5.5. Adapting the Population Size for Optimal Resource Coverage
In order to reduce the number of individuals under test, the population size is adapted.
For example, if in the final stage of testing, |S| = 3 even though the ppreset may be greater
than 3, only 3 individuals, each using one of the suspect resources is required for
isolation to complete. Such a situation occurs frequently in the beginning of the isolation
process. For example, with a resource redundancy ratio, rr = 0.5, in the first stage, only
two individuals are required to cover the entire resource space. Additional individuals
will only form tests for resources that are already covered by these two, and will thus be
redundant. The number of individuals required in any stage of testing is given by:

⎡ |S| ⎤
p stage = ⎢
⎥
⎢ nshare ⎥

(5.7)

Reducing the number of individuals in a test stage provides two benefits. First, it
significantly reduces the time required for the fault isolation process.

Secondly, it

reduces the number of redundant test groups – making the algorithm more reasonable. In
particular, a reasonable group testing procedure is one that contains no test whose
outcome can be predicted from outcomes of other tests conducted previously [12].

Once nshare and pstage are known, the individuals for a given generation are created, and
then tested. As shown in Figure 5.2, testing comprises the third phase of the isolation
process. The tests are conducted by randomly selecting an individual ci for instantiation
on the FPGA. A test vector tj is then applied to the individual. If D(ti, cj) ≠ {}, all H
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matrix entries H(x,y) are incremented by one where (x, y) are the coordinates of all ri(x,y)

∈ cj. Regardless of whether there is a discrepancy, this configuration is then replaced by
another, and the testing continues.

When a configuration containing the defective

resource is tested, the probability of the fault being expressed as a discrepant output is
governed by the articulation rate, a(ci), of that configuration. Once a fault is articulated,
the set of suspects will be reduced to the intersection of the resources utilized by cj and
the resources H(x,y) = Hmax. Thus:

Snew = cj ∩ H

(5.8)

where hmax is the maximal element in the history matrix H(x,y)

5.6. Overcoming Stasis During Isolation
A state of Stasis is encountered in a stage of the isolation procedure if further tests on
configurations comprising the stage are expected to lead to no significant reduction in the
number of suspect resources. By Definition 6.4, stasis occurs when forward progress
stalls. Defining a method to overcome stasis is essential to ensure fast fault isolation.

Since the suspect resources were equally shared among the individuals in the population,
the maximum possible reduction in |S| is given by:

|S|
= nshare
| S new |
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(5.9)

Once |Snew| is obtained, the system is defined to have entered a state of stasis, when
further improvements to the defect scouring ratio, d(stage), have stalled.

Further

reduction in |S|, beyond those described in Equation(6.9) is only possible if there exists
another individual in the same generation that also utilizes the defective resource. Since
such an individual is not guaranteed to exist and to articulate the fault, stasis is declared
after the suspect pool is reduced by the factor shown in Equation(6.9). Stasis can also
occur when the individual utilizing the defective resource does not articulate the fault, or
does so with a very low articulation rate. Thus, stasis occurs when no discrepant outputs
are observed after a fixed number of inputs are applied.

5.7. Walkthrough of Isolation Process
As an example of the isolation process, consider a situation where there is one defective
resource with the coordinates (1,8) in a set of R = 100 resources, where ri(x,y) ∈ R,
0 < x,y < 9. For simplicity, let us assume that a configuration that utilizes the defective
resource always articulates the fault at the output. The number of resources required to
implement the application is nreqd = 35. Thus, for the first stage, by Equation(6.6):

nshare = 35 – 100 +100 = 35

(5.10)

For nshare = 35, and population preset, ppreset = 5, by Equation(6.7), we have:

⎡100 ⎤

=3
Population size for the first stage , p1 = ⎢
⎢ 35 ⎥⎥
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(5.11)

Thus, in the first stage, there are three configurations, the first, c0 uses resources ri(x,y)
where 0 < x < 4, 0 < y < 5, i.e., 35 resources with coordinates (0,0) through (3,4)
inclusive; c1 uses resources with coordinates (3,5) through (6,9) and c2 uses resources
(7,0) through (9,9) and (0,0) through (0,4) inclusive. Over a period, each of these three
configurations are chosen at random and inputs are applied, until a discrepancy is
observed.

Since the defective resource (1,8) is used by c0, this configuration will

articulate the fault. When this occurs, the H matrix entries corresponding to the resources
with coordinates (0,0) through (3,4) used by c0 will be incremented by one. The set of
suspect resources S now has a cardinality of 35, and contains the resources used by c0.
After this first discrepant output, the cardinality of S exceeds the critical cardinality of
35. Also, the prime realization for this experiment is 1, since c1 is known fault-free after

c0 is identified as the discrepant configuration.

As the set of suspects has diminished by a factor equal to nshare, the next stage of
configurations is formed. The number of suspects can be divided equally among the
members of this new stage, thus, each new configuration will contain 35/5 = 7 suspect
resources. The rest of the resources to create the 5 configurations are chosen at random
from the 100-35 = 65 members of S . Thus, in the second stage of testing, c0 will use the
suspect resources with coordinates (0,0) through (0,6) and the other configurations will
use 7 suspect resources each, in order. The defective resource with coordinates (1,8) will
be utilized by configuration c2. In the tests performed in the second stage, c2 will
articulate a fault, and H matrix entries corresponding to resources with coordinates (1,4)
through (2,0) inclusive will be incremented by one.
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In the next stage, only four configurations need be created, with the first three
configurations utilizing two of the seven suspect resources. This stage will further reduce

S to two suspect resources. Finally in the last stage of testing, only two configurations
will be created, with the first using the resource with coordinates (1,8) and the second
utilizing the resource with coordinates (1,9). Tests on these two configurations will
finally yield (1,8) as the defective resource. Thus, in four stages, the defective resource
will be uniquely identified.

5.8. The Fault Isolation and Analysis Toolkit for Xilinx FPGAs
The UCF Fault Injection and Analysis Toolkit (FIAT) is a set of Python APIs that aid the
analysis of fault-testing algorithms for Xilinx FPGAs.

Faults are injected in the

implemented designs by editing the design file. This precludes the need to edit the
configuration bitstream directly. The Xilinx ISE design tools are used in the process flow
to place and route the edited designs. FIAT can be used to model and evaluate various
testing regimens that seek to identify and isolate faults in FPGAs. The toolkit enables
easy injection of faults without directly modifying the bitstream.

The principle of

interfering minimally with the functions of the Xilinx ISE is adopted to reduce accidental
bitstream errors that may invalidate the design or even damage the FPGA.

The

generation of post-place-and-route simulation executables offers a fast and reliable way
of analyzing test routines without the additional expense of downloading the designs and
reconfiguring FPGAs.
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FIAT provides the following functions to enable the modeling and evaluation of group
testing regimen:

get_list_slices_used(proj_path, xdl_fn): This method takes the project path(proj_path)
and the xdl filename(xdl_fn) as inputs and returns a list of slices used by the design
specified by the xdl file.

get_slice_count(proj_path, xdl_fn): Returns an integer representing the number of slices
used by the specified xdl file.

Inputs are the xdl filename(xdl_fn) and the project

path(proj_path).

is_slice_used(proj_path, xdl_fn, x, y): Returns a Boolean value corresponding to whether
or not a slice specified by its x and y coordinates is utilized by the design specified by the
xdl filename(xdl_fn).

disclists(list1, list2): This function returns an integer representing the number of
discrepancies observed in comparing the two lists list1 and list2.

modify_xdl(proj_path, xdl_fn, slice_coords, g_or_f, faulty_pin):

The

modify_xdl

function inserts stuck-at faults in a specified design. The slice where the stuck-at-fault is
to be inserted is specified by a coordinate pair(slice_coords). The G or F LUT in the
slice can be chosen using the g_or_f parameter. faulty_pin specifies the pin in the LUT
where the stuck-at-fault needs to be injected.
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create_ucf(proj_path, ucf_fn, occ_area_xy, f_max_x, f_max_y, occ_area, req_resources,
pop): This method creates UCF files and placed-and-routed designs according to the
specified parameters to aid the physical placement of the design on the FPGA. The
proj_path and ucf_fn parameters define the project path and the UCF filename.
occ_area_xy specifies the area that the design has to be placed in as a coordinate pair.
All resources outside the square area defined by occ_area_xy are prohibited from being
used in the design. f_max_x and f_max_y specify the maximum value of the x and y
coordinates for resources that can be utilized by the design. occ_area defines the number
of resources available for use by the design and req_resources defines the number of
resources that are essential for instantiating the design. This figure can be ascertained by
assessing the minimum number of slices required by the design. The pop parameter
defines the population size, or the number of unique designs that need to be produced.
The create_ucf function creates pop number of unique ucf files where the resources used
are chosen at random. The amount of slices available for implementing the design can be
varied from (occ_area – req_resources) to occ_area depending on the needs of the test
routine by using custom functions to determine the selection of resources. After creating
the UCF files, the create_ucf function proceeds to create the NCD files for the designs
and converts the NCD files to XDL files which can then be modified according to need
using the modify_xdl function.

simulate_ppr(proj_path, sim_fn):

The simulate_ppr function accepts the project path

and the name of the simulation executable as inputs. It invokes the Xilinx commands to
compile the HDL design, testbench files, and simulation libraries to create the simulation
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executables. Finally it runs the simulation. This is useful in conjunction with testbench
files that save the output of the simulation in the form of text files.

5.9. Creating and Modifying Alternatives with FIAT
FIAT provides a high level of control over the physical location of the logical units used
in the design. In particular FIAT provides methods for modifying and parsing the User
Constraint File (UCF) and the Xilinx Design Language (XDL) file. The XDL file is a
plain text file that can be created from the NCD file using the xdl command line tool
provided by Xilinx. Throughout the design flow, the Xilinx ISE tools are used all
processes except for those that edit and parse the UCF and XDL files. The tools provided
by FIAT can be used for determining the physical placement of the logical units by
editing the UCF file. Stuck-at faults are injected into the design by converting the NCD
file to the XDL format and then using the FIAT APIs to insert the fault at the chosen
LUT. The presence of a stuck-at fault ties the signal at the input of the chosen LUT in a
slice to zero or one. After fault injection, the XDL file is converted back to an NCD file.
Placement and routing is completed automatically using the Xilinx ISE. The post-placeand-route simulation executable is created using the provide testbench and the simulation
libraries.

Figure 5.4 shows the processes that constitute the FIAT design flow. The input files for
the process are the HDL files specifying the combinatorial design to be instantiated on
the FPGA. These files are synthesized to build a netlist, which FIAT then builds, maps,
places and routes using commands provided by the Xilinx ISE 9.1i tools. In the last step
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a post-place-and-route simulation executable is created using the user-provided testbench
and the simulation libraries. The same Native Circuit Description (NCD) file used to
create the simulation executable can also yield the configuration bitstream for a hardware
implementation of the design.

The generation of post-place-and-route simulation

executables offers a flexible and accurate way of analyzing test routines. In addition to
providing methods to implement designs using the Xilinx commands, FIAT provides
automated methods to edit physical constraints and to inject faults into configuration
bitstreams.

FIAT provides a high-level of control over the physical location of the slices used to
create a configuration by providing APIs to modify the User Constraint File (UCF).
This enables editing configurations before they are placed and routed. Given a set of
suspect resources to be used by each configuration, FIAT creates the UCF files to ensure
the use of the suspect resources. It then invokes the Xilinx place-and-route tool provided
in the ISE 9.1i platform to realize the designs required by the AGT.
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Figure 5.4: Fault Isolation Using FIAT – An Overview
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Since it is not viable to destructively modify the FPGA hardware resources, stuck-at
faults need to be simulated in the configurations to enable analysis of the AGT algorithm.
Stuck-at faults are simulated in the experiments by editing all configurations to exhibit
behavior consistent with the presence of a stuck-at fault at one of the input pins of a
specified LUT. To inject the fault, FIAT converts the NCD file, which describes the
placed-and-routed design, to the Xilinx Description Language (XDL) format using the xdl
command line tool provided by Xilinx. This text file is then edited to modify the logic
function instantiated on the target fault-affected LUT. The presence of a stuck-at fault
ties the signal at the input of the fault-affected LUT to zero or one. After fault injection,
the XDL file is converted back to an NCD file. Placement and routing is then completed
automatically using the Xilinx tools included in the ISE 9.1i suite.

FIAT precludes the need to edit the configuration bitstream directly. Throughout the
design flow, the Xilinx 9.1i ISE tools are used for all processes except for those that parse
and edit the UCF and XDL files. The Xilinx design tools, such as netgen, par, ngdbuild,
and fuse are invoked by FIAT in the design flow to place and route the edited designs.
This principle of interfering minimally with the functions of the Xilinx ISE reduces
accidental bitstream errors that may invalidate the design or irrecoverably damage the
FPGA.
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CHAPTER 6: CHARACTERISTICS, CAPABILITIES, AND
METRICS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

Experiments on the AGT algorithms were conducted using post-place-and-route designs
created for the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro FPGA. A 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES-56)
encryption/decryption implementation was used in generating the data. Sections 6.1, 6.2,
and 6.3 present results from these experiments with regards to the efficacy and the impact
of system parameters on the algorithm.

6.1. Experimental Configuration for the Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA
The AGT, together with FIAT, implements the controller for autonomous fault handling.
As shown is Figure 5.4, this controller receives observed feedback and updates the design
population across stages. FIAT has been constructed as part of the work presented using
the Python programming language to provide APIs to edit resource constraints, introduce
stuck-at-faults, and generate post-place-and-route designs, as described previously in
Section 5.9.

Experiments were conducted on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA xc2vp4-7ff672 model using the
Xilinx ISE 9.1i design platform. The 7ff672 package provides 3008 slices and 348 InputOutput Blocks (IOBs).

To analyze performance of the algorithm, the following characteristics are defined by the
functionality of the application implemented on the FPGA:
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Definition 6.1. The application resource demand, nreqd is the minimal cardinality of any
design configuration |ci|, required to implement the application on the FPGA.

Definition 6.2.

The resource redundancy ratio, rr is defined as the ratio of the

application resource demand to the cardinality of the set of all resources |R|

rr =

nreqd
|R|

(6.1)

Definition 6.3. The critical cardinality is the cardinality of |SC| such that |SC| = nreqd.

Definition 6.4. The prime realization is the index i, of the first identified subset ci, which
satisfies the two conditions: ci ⊂ S and |ci| ≥ nreqd.

Let:

p be the population size

R be the total number of resources

T be the total number of tests to exhaustively test the configurations

A be the mean articulation rate of the population,

and
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ρ be the fault articulation rate for a configuration, defined as follows:

ρ = rr .A

(6.2)

Additionally, the probability that a given configuration is affected by a single random
fault in any of the R resources is given by the resource redundancy ratio ρ.

Since the tests are independent of each other, and the results of the random tests follow a
binomial distribution, the probability that exactly n faults are observed in S tests is given
by:

⎛S ⎞
P(n) = ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ρ n (1 − ρ ) S −n
⎝n⎠

(6.3)

Let the outcome x be defined as the number of the successes identified in S tests. A

success is when a fault is observed. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) denoted as
F(X) describes the probability that the outcome x ≤ X.

The cdf for x successes in S tests, where the probability of success is ρ, is given by:

F ( x; S , ρ ) = P( X ≤ x) = ∑ P( xi )

(6.4)

xi ≤ x

Various methods to approximate bounds for the cdf exist, notably when x < Sρ, the

Hoeffding’s inequality yields the upper bound:
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⎛ 1 ( Sρ − x ) 2 ⎞
⎟⎟
F ( x; S , ρ ) ≤ exp⎜⎜ −
2
ρ
S
⎠
⎝

(6.5)

Then, from Equation (7.2), the probability that a certain configuration is observed as
being faulty at least once over S tests on the population is given by the complementary

cumulative distribution function (ccdf), given by

P(X ≥ x) = 1 − F ( x; S , ρ )

(6.6)

Of particular interest is the probability that a particular configuration is observed as being
faulty at least once after S tests. This probability can be calculated by noting that the
probability that a certain configuration is selected for testing is (1/p). This modifies the
probability for success to (ρ/p) as compared to ρ earlier.

The probability that a particular configuration is observed as being faulty at least once
after S tests is therefore given by:

P(X ≥ 1) = 1- F(1;S,(ρ/p))

(6.7)

and the upper bound is approximated as:

ρ
⎞
⎛
( S − 1) 2 ⎟
⎜
1
ρ
p
⎟
= F (1; S , ) ≤ exp⎜ −
⎟
⎜
ρ
S
p
⎟
⎜ 2p
⎠
⎝
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(6.8)

Let μ

n

be the mean number of tests for n different configurations to be identified as

faulty.

The mean number of tests before one configuration is identified as faulty is the mean of
the binomial distribution, defined as:

μ 1= Sρ

(6.9)

The mean of the number of tests required to identify another configuration as being faulty
is the sum of the mean time taken for one configuration to be identified as faulty, and the
mean of the number of tests where another configuration is paired with the faulty
configuration, or, itself articulates the fault, therefore:

⎞
⎛
⎟
⎜
ρ ( p − 1) ⎟
⎜
μ 2 = μ 1 + S⎜ρ +
⎛ p ⎞ ⎟⎟
⎜
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎟
⎜
⎝2⎠ ⎠
⎝

(6.10)

Further, since comparing a configuration to a faulty configuration will result in the
configuration being marked as Suspect, the probability that all the configurations are
marked as faulty is given by the probability that a faulty configuration is chosen, and all
the other configurations are chosen in turn to be paired with the faulty configuration.

The DES-56 implementation utilizes 304 slices and 191 bonded IOBs. Thus, for the fault
isolation experiments, the application resource demand, nreqd = 304. The total gateequivalent count for the design is 5266. The area under test on the FPGA can be varied
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by controlling the total resources, R, available for placing and routing the design. This
enables varying rr for the experiments. Initially, the DES-56 core was synthesized,
mapped, placed, and routed on the FPGA. This model was later modified using FIAT
according to the requirements of the AGT to form configurations and test stages. For
each of these configurations, a simulation executable was created using a testbench. The
inputs for the DES-56 circuits were obtained from the National Bureau of Standards
publication 500-20 [61]. These inputs comprehensively test the functionality of hardware
implementations of DES-56. Sixty of these inputs, representing a cross-section of the
NBS test suite were used to create the test bench.

6.2. Isolation Progress Across Test Stages in AGT
Figure 6.1 shows the progress of defect isolation across various stages for ppreset= 5 for
three different experimental runs. The best performance is seen in experiment 1, where
fault isolation is completed using 5 stages of tests. A total of 21 different configurations
were created to identify the single defective resource. In the first test stage, three
individuals were created, one of which utilized the fault-affected resource and articulated
the fault. Thus, at the end of stage 1, the number of suspect resources drops from 625 to
304. The two individuals in stage 1 that do not utilize the defective slice are the prime
realizations of the circuit which can provide fault-free implementations on demand.
Also, by the end of stage 1, | S | = 625–304 = 314 > nreqd, and thus, critical cardinality is
met. In stages 2, 3, and 4, five configurations each are created, as pstage = ppreset = 5.
Since the equal sharing method is used to create the configurations in each group, the
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⎡ |S| ⎤
number of suspect resources decreases by a factor of ⎢
⎥ in each stage. In the final
⎢ pstage ⎥
stage, since |S| = 3, only three configurations are created. The number of discrepant
outputs in all the tests is equal to the number of test stages since at the occurrence of the
first discrepant output, the creation of a new group of configurations is initiated.
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Figure 6.1: Fault Isolation Progress Across Stages for ppreset = 5
As shown in Figure 6.1, in the Experiment 2, no progress is made in the third stage of
testing, where the number of suspect resources remains at 61. This is due to the fact that
the individual utilizing the fault-affected resource does not articulate the fault, leading to
a stasis in the system. In stage 4, five new individuals replace the configurations in the
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population. In this stage, the configuration with the faulty resource articulates the fault,
leading to a decrease in the number of suspects. Similarly, in the third experiment, stasis
occurs in the fifth stage. This increases the number of stages to isolate the fault and the
total number of configurations created.

In the best performing experiment, five stages were required, and five tests with
discrepant outputs are observed before the defect is isolated. Even in the worst case, with
a test stage containing configurations that do not articulate the fault, only five
discrepancies are observed. Non-articulating individuals that use the faulty resource
increase the time taken to scour the defects, but do not affect the observed goodput. In
addition, in all these case, since rr < 0.5, the prime realization, as well as a non-suspect
set of resources with a cardinality greater than the critical cardinality are obtained after
the first discrepant test output.

6.3. Effect of Population Preset on Defect Scouring Rate
The scouring rate is directly proportional to the population preset, ppreset. Table 6.1 lists
the observed defect scouring performance for varying values of ppreset. A total of 15
experiments were conducted for each value of ppreset. The physical logical resource
overhead for the AGT-based technique can be varied by adjusting the resource
redundancy ratio, rr. In all these experiments, initially, |R| = 625. This value was chosen
as 252 = 625 yields a redundancy ratio rr = 304/625 = 0.49 ≈ 0.5. As the column labeled
M2 in Table II indicates, throughout the experiments, a subset of non-suspect resources,
with cardinality S > nreqd, is identified after the first stage of testing. Similarly, from the
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results for metric M3 in Table 6.1, it is shown that the prime realization, which provides a
fault-free replacement configuration, is consistently identified from within the first group
of configurations. The number of discrepant outputs, or positive tests required to isolate
the fault is the same as the number of stages, since the articulation of a fault will
immediately improve the scouring rate and trigger formation of the next stage of tests.
Table 6.1: Results from Experiments With Varying Population Preset Values

ppreset

5
10
15
20
25

Fault Resolution Metrics*

Number of Stages

Number of Configurations

M1

M2

M3

Best

Worst

Mean

Best

Worst

Mean

5
4
3
3
3

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

5
4
3
3
3

7
5
4
4
4

5.53
4.27
3.20
3.13
3.13

21
27
35
39
41

31
37
38
59
66

23.67
29.67
35.47
42.73
44.27

* Fault Resolution Metrics:
M1: Number of observed discrepant outputs before the defective resource is isolated.
M2: Number of stages required to surpass critical cardinality for S .
M3: Number of stages required to identify the prime realization.
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Figure 6.2: Effect of Population Preset on the Scouring Rate
Figure 6.2 shows the best defect scouring performance of AGT for increasing values of
ppreset. Each curve depicts the size of the suspect pool, |S|, at the beginning of the test
stage depicted on the x-axis. For all values of ppreset , population size, pstage = 3 in the first
stage of testing, by Equation(6.7). In all other stages except the last stage, pstage = ppreset.
In the last stage, pstage is equal to the number of remaining suspect resources. The slope
of the curve is proportional to the defect scouring ratio, and it increases proportionately
with ppreset. Except in the initial and last stages, defect scouring proceeds at a logarithmic
rate, when the articulation rate for the configuration utilizing the defective resource is
non-zero. Most significantly, across all values of ppreset the defective is isolated with 5
or fewer positive tests.

Assuming that the time taken to reconfigure the device is

insignificant when compared to the mean time between defects, the AGT-based method
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can tolerate faults with minimal loss of goodput, with ppreset = 5, which will require the
minimal number of reconfigurations.

The total number of configurations created in each of the five best performing
experiments are shown in Figure 6.3.

As ppreset increases, the total number of

configurations increases. However, there is only two extra configurations are required
for ppreset = 25 as opposed to ppreset = 20. Figure 6.3 also shows the number of test stages
as a function of ppreset. With increasing ppreset , each stage reduces the number of suspects
by a factor proportional to the population size. Thus, with increasing ppreset, though a
decreased number of stages are required, the total number of configurations required is
increased.
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Figure 6.3: Total Test Stages and Configurations Created for Varying Population Presets
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6.4. Maintaining System Throughput During Fault Isolation
System goodput, defined as the percentage of useful outputs, can be maintained at a
pre-defined level throughout the fault isolation process using a feedback mechanism and
an observer-controller model.

The system goodput decreases each time there is a

discrepant output – fault isolation will proceed faster with more frequent discrepancies.
Thus, the tradeoff involved in maintaining goodput is that fault isolation will proceed at a
slower rate.

Figure 6.4 shows the observed goodput as a function of the number of tests completed for
three different values of required goodput throughout the fault isolation process. In all
three experiments, the value used for the population present, ppreset = 5. In the first
experiment, the system-level goal is to maintain a goodput of 0.99. A discrepant output
is observed in the first ten tests, leading to a goodput of 0.90. Since this is lower than the
performance goal, the system responds by utilizing the fault-free configuration until the
goodput is restored to 0.99 by the hundredth test. Afterwards, the next stage of testing
proceeds. When the fault-affected configuration in the second stage articulates the fault,
the goodput drops to 0.982 by the 110th test. Again, the system waits for the goodput to
return to 0.99 before proceeding with conducting the third stage of tests. After 500 tests,
after five positive tests, fault isolation is complete. The observed goodput will then
continue to rise past 99%. In the second and third experiments, the goodput requirement
is 0.95, and 0.90 respectively. As seen in Figure 6.4, for experiment 3, the system
goodput never falls below 90% throughout the isolation process. After 10 tests, the
goodput falls to 0.90 and rises subsequently until the fault is isolated in 320 tests.
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Figure 6.4: System Goodput Vs. Total Number of Tests
The time taken to create the configurations and reconfigure the FPGA is not reflected in
the system goodput measurement. The goodput measured here is that of only the AGTcontrolled system. Since AGT verifies correct functional behavior using output response
analysis, it is essential to have an identical fault-free implementation of the same
functionality, which would provide the correct outputs to which the outputs of the AGTmonitored configurations can be compared. Under a single-fault assumption, when the
portion of the FPGA monitored by the observer is being reconfigured, the system outputs
are provided by the other fault-free configuration.

Overall, the AGT-based autonomous method can isolate the single defective with a
minimal number of positive tests, as low as 3, as listed in Table 6.1. This result is made
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even more significant by the fact that this method avoids the use of exhaustive serial test
procedures. Of all the previous approaches in Table 2.1, the roving STARS approach is
the only comprehensive fault tolerance solution that isolates defects at a granularity lower
than 1% of the total resources on an FPGA. Compared to this approach, the AGT-based
technique has a minimal fault detection latency, and thus a higher expected goodput. In
addition, as shown by the experiments where the goodput is maintained at a pre-defined
value, the AGT algorithm can be used to build an autonomous fault tolerant solution that
accomplishes system-level goals.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This dissertation demonstrated the feasibility of an integrated approach to fault handling
in FPGAs. A population of alternatives, when combined with a competitive evolutionary
strategy, provides a framework that refurbishes fault-affected configurations. Group
testing-based fault isolation methods are presented. Based on a straightforward FPGA
model, an autonomous group-testing algorithm for runtime fault isolation that removes
the need for exhaustive test inputs and the need for the system to be taken offline is
developed. To this end, a discrepancy detector is designed for fault detection. In order to
demonstrate the flexibility of group testing techniques, a group testing-based technique
for identifying faulty FPGA embedded cores is also presented that highlights the utility of
group testing for exhaustive functional testing.

FIAT, a fault analysis toolkit, is

developed to enable fault isolation experiments on FPGAs. Finally, an autonomous
group testing technique is demonstrated that maintains the system goodput at pre-defined
levels throughout the fault isolation process.

7.1. Graceful Degradation of Performance
In applications where the FPGA on which the application is deployed cannot be retrieved
for repair or replacement, graceful degradation of service is a highly desirable quality.
Deep-space deployment of FPGAs provides an example of such a scenario.

In

deep-space, the probability of failures also increases due to the absence of a protective
atmosphere.

In this high-ionizing radiation environment, multiple hardware faults
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induced by high-energy particles demand a fault tolerance implementation that can
ensure that the system remains available even in the presence of faults. While fast
recovery from faults is essential, certain applications might demand that the FPGA
continue to provide service, at reduced availability, as opposed to not providing any
service at all during the recovery process. A system that degrades gracefully as faults
appear should be able to handle faults while continuing to provide acceptable levels of
service. Through the elimination of additional test vectors and by using a temporal
assessment process based on aging and outlier identification, CRR provides a selfregulating repair mechanism with reduced downtime which is also capable of such
graceful degradation.

With a limited pool of resources on an FPGA, sustainable fault handling is achieved only
when the available resources are recycled. Such resource recycling needs to leverage
residual functionality provided by defective resources. A LUT which has a stuck-at fault
at one of the input pins might still provide residual functionality. Section 3.8 shows that
such functionality can be leveraged by a system that measures performance by evaluating
the outputs to actual runtime inputs – as opposed to a system where the resources are
exhaustively tested using additional test vectors.

As an example, an evolutionary

algorithm that relies on a fitness function-based evaluation of a configuration’s
performance might tolerate a LUT with a stuck-at fault at one input pin, if the faulty input
pin is not used by the configuration. A design in which the faulty four-input LUT is only
required to receive three-bit inputs will be identified as being fully-fit by an FPGA, but
will be precluded from use if the resources were to be tested exhaustively.
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7.2. Improving Evolutionary Repair using a Population of Alternatives
Two major improvements over a more conventional GA-based repair scheme are
observed. First, this dissertation provides evidence for a significant improvement in fault
handling capability by exploiting population diversity during all phases of the fault
handling process. By relying on the inherent information contained in a population of
alternatives, the approach improves on previous techniques for evolutionary fault
handling that have the objective of creating a single best-fit individual. In CRR, the
population of alternatives is classified into separate pools of relative operability, and all
individuals are refurbished over time with no one individual being preferred over others.
As opposed to previous approaches, the goal of CRR is to maintain a healthy population,
as opposed to creating one single individual that acts as the responder in the case of
faults. Secondly, GAs asymptotically approach the perfect configuration. With CRR,
these partially fit configurations provide an increased benefit. CRR’s competitive focus
automatically chooses the best performing configurations for a given input space.

A significant observation made during fault refurbishment experiments is that a system
that functions in a fully-fit manner can be realized using configurations that are not
themselves fully-fit. Individuals that perform best for the subset of inputs that are
observed provide high goodput even when they may not demonstrate ideal behavior for
the entire input space. As the subset of observed inputs change over time, alternate
partially-fit configurations may be identified that provide high quality service for the new
inputs. Such redundancy can occur at minimal physical resource overhead and is limited
by the storage space requirement and reconfiguration time.
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Interestingly, the dual-

competition system presented in CRR can easily be extended to three competing modules
to provide a more traditional TMR system that can provide even higher quality of service
at the cost of the physical resources needed to implement an extra module.

7.3. Fast Fault Response using Group Testing
While the evolutionary algorithm excels at recycling resources and finding solutions that
may seem counter-intuitive, this comes at the cost of the time required to identify the
solution. This is where group testing-based isolation provides a direct benefit by fast
identification of the fault-affected resource. More importantly, by tracking the resource
allocation across configurations, this also provides alternative configurations to respond
to faults with minimal latency. The group testing-based fault isolation method presented
in this work demonstrates the capability for the fast isolation of logic faults, and, more
importantly, the ability to maintain the system’s availability and goodput throughout the
fault isolation process. For example, Section 6.6 shows how the AGT system maintains
the system goodput at 90%.

This does not have to delay the speed with which a

functioning configuration is identified to respond to the fault. The experiments in Section
6.3 show that with as few as three discrepant outputs, the system identifies the faulty
resources for a DES implementation.

Due to the use of multiple alternative

configurations that are designed in a way that minimizes the probability for all
configurations to be affected by the same hardware resource fault, a handy replacement
for guaranteed service is immediately available in case of a single fault.
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The versatility of group testing-based isolation is clearly demonstrated by the case study
where fault embedded cores in FPGAs were identified using BIST techniques. Group
testing techniques are also shown to suitable for exhaustive offline testing, and can
provide a significant improvement in fault isolation time over a more conventional BIST
approach as demonstrated. A 640 DSP core FPGA device is tested exhaustively with a
30% testing resource overhead in a single stage of tests that are designed using group
testing principles. An adaptive multi-stage group testing algorithm can provide fault
isolation for online FPGAs. This dissertation demonstrates viability, and the methods
presented here can be further enhanced and improved based on the specific system in
which they are implemented. For example, a group testing regimen can be developed for
TMR systems, and improvements to many other exhaustive testing are possible using
various group testing techniques that have already been analyzed and researched.

7.4. Future Work
While CRR is show to be capable of achieving refurbishment in combinational logic
circuits in Section 3.8, it remains to be seen if it can be extended to sequential logic
circuits. The challenge in extending the approach to sequential logic circuits is primarily
one of being able to formulate a strategy for evaluating the fitness of alternative designs.
For any sequential circuit of substantial size, the number of states of the circuit, and
transitions between the states make fitness evaluation challenging. A general strategy to
enable evolutionary repair of sequential circuits remains to be addressed. Also, CRR
provides coverage for only the logic resources. Though there are several approaches for
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tolerating faults in the interconnect resources, the choices are severely limited when it
comes to online isolation of such faults. Thus, the integration of interconnect-fault and
logic-fault handling strategies for online fault-handling remains a major challenge.

Partial reconfiguration in COTS FPGAs is currently hindered by severe limitations, and
support for partial reconfiguration is subjective at best. Currently, the time taken for
partial reconfiguration is a significant bottleneck in effecting repairs. The lack of welltested and supported APIs to reconfigure only a portion of the FPGA while keeping the
rest of the FPGA operational is also a major roadblock [62]. To realize fast online fault
handling, there is a need for more open standards and improved support for partial
reconfiguration. In commercial SRAM FPGAs there is a very high level of dependency
on the design tools provided by the manufacturer. With an open bitstream structure, and
more portable design tools, it may be possible in the future to instantiate evolutionary
algorithms within the design loop.

Currently, due to the closed nature of the

configuration bitstream’s structure, one has to rely on the Xilinx tools to produce the
configuration bitstream, and it is almost impossible to produce and modify the bitstream
in a guaranteed fashion to achieve desired functional changes.

Finally, further enhancements can be made to FIAT, and FIAT can be used to analyze the
performance of alternative group testing strategies. Since it provides a set of tools for the
injection of faults, and to manage and track resource allocation across configurations, it
should serve as a useful tool for further experiments in FPGA fault tolerance. While this
dissertation provides a new paradigm for a hardware-in-the-loop online fault tolerance
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strategy, several alternative target technologies, such as software reliability tools, or
future nano-scale mechanisms can benefit from the same principles.
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